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JUDICIAL REVIEW, OF STATUTES:
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF
PRESENT INSTITUTIONS
AND PRACTICES
Wilhelm Karl Geckt
Judicial review of statutes by independent courts is practiced in numerous states. The following survey presents in systematic order the greatly
varying court systems and the vastly differing proceedings which serve the
common goal of safeguarding the constitution against the legislature. The
article includes Yugoslavia, which recently, as the only Communist state,
instituted judicial review of statutes by specialized constitutional courts.
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I
PREREQUISITES

The role of courts as guardians of the Constitution is familiar in the
United States. It was described with particular clarity in Marbury v.
Madison,' but it antedates this well-known decision. Partly due to the
example of the United States Supreme Court, constitutional jurisdiction
-4.e., the competence of all or certain courts to guarantee the supremacy
of the constitution by measuring governmental actions against it-spread
over most of Latin America and parts of Europe. After World War II
constitutional jurisdiction expanded greatly. Largely motivated by the
experiences with totalitarian dictatorship, Italy, the Federal Republic of
Germany,2 and Austria created or reestablished constitutional jurisdiction
t Professor of Law, University of the Saarland, Saarbruecken, Germany. Dr. Geck
formerly held positions with the Federal Ministry of Justice, as research assistant at the
Federal Constitutional Court, and as a District Court Judge.
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803). For a short general historical survey, see Marcic,
Verfassung und Verfassungsgericht 168 (1963). See also Engelhardt, "Das richterliche
Priifungsrecht im modernen Verfassungsstaat," 8 Jahrbuch des 5ffentlichen Rechts der
Gegenwart-Neue Folge 101 (1959) [hereinafter cited as J.&R.].
2 Germany for short. In the part of Germany now under communist rule judicial review
of statutes is nonexistent.
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in specialized constitutional courts. Germany provided for the most extensive and at the same time most tightly-knit system. This was mainly
done through a specialized constitutional court in the Federal Republic,
as well as through those in its member states ("Lander").1 France for the
first time instituted judicial review or control (the terms are used interchangeably here) of statutes in the de Gaulle Constitution of 1958, and
Turkey created a Constitutional Court on its return to more democratic
procedures under the Constitution of 1961.1 In Cyprus the Supreme Constitutional Court was to guard the Constitution of 1960, and thereby
preserve the precarious balance between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority.5 Many states upon achieving independence set up some
kind of constitutional jurisdiction in their new constitutions; examples
among the former French colonies in Africa are Madagascar, Mall,
Mauretania and Chad." The constitution adopted in the Republic of
Korea (South Korea) on December 26, 1962, after the revolution, makes
the Supreme Court the final judge of the constitutionality of administrative orders, regulations and dispositions, and under certain conditions,
laws.7 Surprisingly, enough provisions for the establishment of a Federal
Constitutional Court with very wide powers, and for constitutional courts
in the member republics of the Federation are found even in the Constitution of Yugoslavia of April 7, 1963. s

3

With the exception of Berlin, all German states have specialized constitutional courts.
In contrast to the Federal Constitutional Court, these state courts convene only occasionally;
their judges do not serve on a full-time basis. Cf. Reck, "9Die Organisation der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in den deutschen Llindern," 4 Das Recht im Amt 369 (1957). As to
Berlin, see Stem, 'Probleme der Errichtung eines Verfassungsgerichts in Berlin," 78
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 696 (1963).
4 Cf. the respective reports in Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Gegenwart-Inderberichte und Rechtsvergleichung, Constitutional Review in the World Today-National
Reports and Comparative Studies, La Juridiction Constitutionnelle b l'poque contemporaine--Exposis de la situation dans diff6rents pays et 6tude comparie. Internationales
Kolloquium-veranstaltet vom Max-Planck-Institut ffir auslindisches Wffentliches Recht
und VIlkerrecht-Heidelberg 1961 (Beitrlige zum ausl1indischen Uffentlichen Recht und
V6lkerrecht No. 36, Mosler ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Review]. This
book is by far the most important and comprehensive survey in existence on constitutional review. See Geck, Book Review, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 644 (1964). See also Azrak,
'rerfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Tiirkei," 11 J.6.R. 73 (1962); Buerstedde, " Kontrolle
der rechtsetzenden Gewalt durch Conseil constitutionnel und Conseil d'Etat nach der
franz~sischen Verfassung vom 4.10.1958," 12 J.6.R. 145 (1963).
5 At the time of this writing the presence of British and United Nations troops is the
main factor in preventing a full-scale civil war. Neither the elaborate and carefullybalanced Constitution nor the Supreme Constitutional Court could bridge the deep
cleavage between the two ethnic groups. Although the Cyprus Constitution may never
again become effective, the Constitutional Court has been included here as a pivotal
institution for preserving a balance between two antagonistic peoples living in one state.
6 Cf. Joel, La RMforme de la Justice en Afrique noire 79 (1963); Stramacci, Le
costituzioni degli stati africani (1963). The practical impact of these constitutional
provisions remains to be seen.
7 Cf. Kun-shik Yun, "Die Verfassungsentwicklung der Republik Korea seit 1948,"
12 J.6.R. 461 (1963), where there is an English translation of the Constitution at 492.
8 Texts in translation: 7 Institute of Comparative Law Beograd, Collection of Yugoslav
Laws "Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (1963) (English);
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These examples not only show that the institution of constitutional
review is "en vogue,"9 but on closer scrutiny they also indicate the great
divergence of form and content in different countries. The variety
becomes apparent with regard to the courts covered; it involves differences in their composition, their status and that of their members, the extent of their jurisdiction, and their effectiveness in the power system. The
divergencies extend down to the basic issues, namely, the true nature and
the stability of the constitutions- establishing judicial review."° The scope
of this paper neither requires nor permits going into all these questions;
only some of them can be treated.
The supervision of the legislature through judicial review of statutes
is only one aspect of constitutional jurisdiction. The other main aspects
are the settlement of certain disputes between a federation and its
member states and between member states, or between the supreme
organs (authorities) of the state," the control of the constitutionality of
executive acts, and the protection of individual rights granted under the
constitution. 2 Yet, with the constant expansion of legislation into almost
all fields of life, and, on the other hand, widespread distrust of legislatures, review of statutes is probably the most important single part of
constitutional jurisdiction. Of course the various judicial activities in
constitutional law show some duplication: judicial review of statutes may
serve the protection of individual or of state-as against federal-rights;
the decision in controversies between the legislature and executive in the
German constitutional provision just mentioned may in practice lead to
the review of a statute and/or indirectly serve the protection of individual
rights, etc. In spite of such overlapping, judicial review of statutes can be
surveyed without touching on all these problems.
Any effective judicial examination of the constitutionality of statutes
has some prerequisites. First, the constitution must outrank ordinary
statute law and must be alterable only through special procedures. If the
Eckhardt, "Die Verfassung der Sozialistischen Foederativen Republik Jugoslawien," Berichte
des Osteuropa-Instituts an der Freien Universitaet Berlin-Heft 59 (1964) (German); Die
Verfassung der sozialistischen f~derativen Republik Yugoslavien, Beograd (1963) (German);
Informations constitutionnelles et parlementaires, 3 S6rie-N* 55-56 (1963) (French).
9 Cf. Constitutional Review at IX-X; the significant title of Marcic, Vom Gesetzesstaat
zum Richterstaat (1957). See also Marcic, Verfassung und Verfassungsgericht (1963),
13 Am. J. Comp. L. 316 (1964).
10 Cf. Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre 151 (1959) (English edition: Political Power and
the Governmental Process (1957)).
11 The Federal Parliament and the Cabinet under Art. 93, Para. 1, No. 1 of the
German Constitution.
12 Cf. Constitutional Review, passim; Marcic, supra note 1, at 93. In some states the
competence of constitutional courts extends even further. In Germany, for example, the
Federal Constitutional Court decides in certain impeachment proceedings and on the
outlawing of unconstitutional political parties. Cf. Friesenhahn, Constitutional Review
89, 168, 175.
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legislature could change the constitution in the same manner as it would
change any statute, as in Italy under the Albertinian Statute (the Constitution of 1848), and, with only a minor exception, in South Africa
now, 3 i.e., without larger majorities, additional voting procedures, and
the like, judicial review of the statutes would be useless.
Second, although it is theoretically possible to measure a statute against
an unwritten or customary constitution, the constitution should be written
in order to serve as a fairly reliable yardstick. Nevertheless, it is not
decisive whether the constitution consists of a single or of several written
instruments, so long as the latter rank higher than ordinary statutes and
are subject to being changed only by more rigorous procedures. 14 Today
almost all independent states have a written constitution which meets
these requirements.
Third, the constitution must provide for a separation of at least the
three classic powers, not only under written law, but also in practice. In
the numerous new African states where a one-party system centers around
a charismatic leader, 15 the separation of powers in the written constitution will not suffice to make statutory review effective. Constitutional
review of statutes cannot be reconciled with any dictatorship, including
the dictatorship of the proletariat. In Yugoslavia the principle of democratic centralism, i.e., the unity of state power, and the one-party system
still remain under the new constitution and make the observer wonder
about the effectiveness of judicial review of statutes provided for in that
constitution." Only the future can tell whether the one communist state
which thus far has accepted judicial review of statutes can have its benefits while still preserving the dominant features of a communist system. 17
The fact that judicial review presupposes a democracy modeled largely on
Cf. Kabn, "The New Constitution," 78 SA.LJ. 244 (1961).
14 E.g., Austria and Finland.
'5 Cf. Blondel, "Constitutional Changes in Former French Black Africa," 14 Parliamentary
Affairs 507 (1960); Ronneberger, "Das Verfassungsproblem in den Entwicklungslaindern,"
1 Der Staat 39 (1962).
16 Cf. Badia, "La Constituci6n Yugoslava de 7 de abril de 1963," 131 Revista de Estudios
Politicos 79 (1963); Ferretjans, "La constitution du 7 Avril 1963 de la Republique socialiste
fd6rative de Yougoslavie et l'unit6 Marxiste du pouvoir d'ltat," Revue du Droit Public
et de la Science Politique en France et it 1'Etranger 939 (1963); Peselj, "Socialist Law
and the New Yugoslav Constitution," 51 Geo. L.J. 651 (1963); Ullmann, "Die neue
Verfassung der Sozialistischen Fdderativen Republik Jugoslawien," 13 Staat und Recht
371 (1964). The most recent publication on constitutional review in Yugoslavia quotes
Yugoslavian writers to the effect that the Constitutional Court must, as a matter of course,
'3

not retard the socialistic development in the name of abstract democratic principles: Schweissguth, "Grundziige der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der SFR Jugoslawien," 6 Jahrbuch fUr
Ostrecht 183, 201 (1965). As this article appeared prior to completion of the present survey,
it can only be mentioned at this point.
17 For a somewhat optimistic view, see Marcic, "Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Jugoslawien," 85 Juristische Blitter 341 (1963). For a sceptical view, see Peselj, supra note
16, at 703. The Federal Yugoslavian Constitutional Court started functioning on February
15, 1964. Its first two judgments were handed down on October 5, 1964.
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western lines does not imply that a democratic system requires the judicial
control of statutes. Great Britain and France, during the longer period of
her modern history, suffice as examples.
Fourth, the constitution must either prescribe judicial review expressis
verbis, as do the recent constitutions setting up specialized constitutional
courts, or at least leave the way open to court interpretation with the
same effect. Marbury v. Madison' and the decision of the German
"Reichsgericht" of November 21, 1925,1" are examples of the courts
establishing judicial review on the strength of constitutional interpretation
and without additional statutory authorization. The jurisdiction of the
German Federal Constitutional Court may illustrate two different bases
for the control of statutes. Certain proceedings are set up explicitly by the
Constitution, but the Constitution also permits additional tasks to be
assigned to the Court by statute. This was done upon the introduction
of the "Verfassungsbeschwerde," a special legal remedy for individuals
against infringements of their basic constitutional rights2 0 The "Verfassungsbeschwerde" may be directed not only against executive and
court decisions, but also against legislative acts, including statutes. Its
foundation is weaker than judicial control relying on an interpretation
of the constitution as in Marbury v. Madison."'
The content of the constitution is important but not necessarily decisive.
The constitution of a federal state with a large number of basic rights will
of course create greater opportunities for judicial review than the constitution of a unitary state without any basic rights. Yet, control of statutes
is also possible in a state of the second category. In South Africa statutes
may be measured only against the two entrenched sections of the constitution whose alteration requires a two-thirds majority of Parliament in
a joint session of both houses. Such brief constitutions as that of the
United States may, at least in the beginning, allow greater freedom of
interpretation than a constitution as detailed as that of India or Cyprus.
But again these differences are not crucial. The institution of judicial
review also does not depend on the kind of courts involved, although
there may be considerable influence on its scope and method depending
on whether it falls to a specialized constitutional court, to any court, or
to the highest court in the general court system2 "
The following survey is not concerned with substantive constitutional
18 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).
19 i11 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 320

cited as R.G.Z.].

(German)

[hereinafter

20 Geck, Book Review, 12 Am. f. Comp. L. 126 (1963); see Part VII of the text infra.
21
22

Cf. authorities cited note 1 supra.
See Part V(4) of the text infra.
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law, but with the courts reviewing the constitutionality of statutes, with
the proceedings and their results, and, as far as possible, with an evaluation. It should be noted that judicial review in this survey centers around
the "materielle Verfassungsmissigkeit," i.e., the question whether a
statute's content is constitutional. The "formelle Verfassungsmissigkeit,"
namely the observance of the procedures prescribed by the constitution
for the adoption of statutes, enters the picture only occasionally. The
necessarily abstract analysis of institutions and proceedings precludes
examining each constitutional court and its activities against its legal and
political background 3 As it is obviously impossible to cover all the constitutions providing in some way for judicial control of statutes, the aim
of this study is to describe the prevalent and typical institutions involved
and their more important methods. By contrasting them with significant
exceptions, a better position from which to gain a fairly balanced picture
will be attained. Lack of space precludes any discussion of the review
of statutes in member states of a federation. The wealth of material
offered, for example, by the forms of judicial review in the states of the
United States and in the German "Ldnder" would not considerably change
the pattern of this survey. The examination is limited to judicial review
of statutes because in a number of states differences exist between the
judicial review of statutes on the one hand and that of lower-ranking law
on the other. The inclusion of the latter would unduly widen the scope
of this examination without compensating advantages.2
II
THE INSTITUTIONS ENGAGED IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES

(1) The judicial authorities engaged in review of statutes may conveniently be classified into three categories: (a) courts of general jurisdiction which simply incorporate the review of statutes in the course of
their ordinary proceedings (incidental or collateral review), (b) courts
of specialized jurisdiction which deal exclusively or at least predominantly
with constitutional questions, and (c) courts of general jurisdiction with
special subdivisions for the determination of constitutional controversies.
These differences do not touch only on the organization of the court
For this purpose, see the reports on 18 states in Constitutional Review.
Since the purpose of this article is to give a bird's-eye view, it seems unnecessary
or even inappropriate to burden the reader with the multitude of constitutional and
statutory provisions, of court decisions and of scholastic opinions which are in some way
relevant to constitutional review in all the countries surveyed. Fortunately the book,
Constitutional Review, is a veritable mine for these materials. Therefore, it seems preferable
to refer the reader to this book in general, and to limit the references in this article to
exceptions, especially to material subsequent to Constitutional Review.
23
24
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system, they have other-sometimes far-reaching--effects, as will be seen
later.2 5
(a) The oldest and outstanding example of the first group is of course
the judicial system in the United States. It has influenced a large number
of Latin American countries, e.g., Argentina and Mexico,2 6 as well as
Japan, the Philippines, and Liberia. In many countries of the Commonwealth the tradition of local appellate tribunals and of the former highest
authority, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, virtually acting
as the court of last resort, has led to a similar development.2" This has
to varying degrees been promoted by the influx of American ideas and
the prestige of the United States Supreme Court. Australia, Canada and
India bear witness. Among the European countries, Denmark, Greece,
Ireland, and Norway supply examples of incidental judicial review by
the regular courts. In many states of this category the judicial authority
to review the constitutionality of statutes is derived from, but not provided for expressis verbis in, the constitutions. In numerous Latin American countries 28 and in Japan, however, the constitutions contain an
explicit authorization. In some states the reviewing power is limited by
certain stipulations. Thus, a lower Indian court may adjudicate a constitutional question only if its High Court or the Supreme Court of India has
already given an interpretation; otherwise it must remit the case to the
High Court for its decision on the constitutional point.2 9 In Colombia all
courts are forbidden to apply a statute they consider unconstitutional
so long as the Supreme Court has not yet decided on the constitutionality.f° If the Supreme Court has made its ruling it is binding on the
lower courts.
(b) Where statutes are reviewed by specialized constitutional courts
a different picture is presented. Austria, Cyprus, France (if we may here
and later include the "Conseil Constitutionnel" among the courts),"
Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Yugoslavia belong to this group.32 With
the exception of Austria, the constitutional courts of these states are of
recent vintage. Their power to review statutes is provided for expressis
25 Cf. Part V(4) of the text infra.

A number of Latin American countries provided for judicial review of statutes
expressis verbis in the constitution. Cf. Engelhardt, supra note 1, at 104-05.
27 See McWhinney, Constitutional Review 75, 77-82; McWhinney, Judicial Review in the
English-Speaking World 14, 49 (2d ed. 1960).
28 Cf. note 26 supra.
29 See Sharma, The Supreme Court in the Indian Constitution 12 (1959). See also Kapur,
"The Supreme Court of India," 11 J.5.R. 1 (1962).
80 Cf. Uprimny, Constitutional Review 338, 374.
81 This point is controversial. Cf. Buerstedde, supra note 4, at 149; Eisenmann &
Hamon, Constitutional Review 231, 256. On the predecessor of this institution, see Buerstedde,
"Le comit6 constitutionnel der franzbsischen Verfassung von 1946," 7 J.6.R. 167 (1958).
32 Except for Yugoslavia, this group is examined in Constitutional Review.
26
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verbis in the constitutions. They are all set apart from the ordinary
courts; they do not serve as courts of appeal in general questions; yet,
with the possible exception of the atypical "Conseil Constitutionnel," they
are the highest judicial authorities of their countries. They are the only
courts whose decisions may not merely settle the pending question but
may have general applicability or, in Germany, even the force of a
statute.33
(c) The best example of a court of general jurisdiction which resolves
constitutional questions through a specialized division is the one federal
court ("Bundesgericht") in Switzerland. It comprises several divisions;
matters of constitutional law usually fall within the competence of the
"Staatsrechtliche Kammer," generally composed of five, occasionally
seven, judges. Its members are chosen from and by the plenum of the
court for a two-year term. It may be mentioned at this point that the
"Bundesgericht" examines only the constitutionality of the "kantonale
Gesetze," i.e., statutes of the Federation's member states.
Still largely an unknown factor are the "chambres constitutionelles"
of the supreme courts in some young African states, such as Dahomey and
Upper Volta.
(2) The numerical composition of courts of general jurisdiction reviewing the constitutionality of statutes varies so widely that only two illustrations should be mentioned. In Norway one judge acting as a court of
first instance can find a statute unconstitutional and refuse to apply it.
On appeal, however, the final decision is handed down not by one of the
usual five-judge benches of the Highest Court, but instead by its plenum.
In India the Supreme Court usually decides cases with three judges, constitutional cases with five judges; yet the Chief Justice may convene a
larger bench and has occasionally done so0 4
We caninot go into the selection process of courts of general jurisdiction.
We may, however, generalize that this task most frequently falls to the
executive, acting either alone or with the consent of the partial or entire
legislature. The number of states with judges elected directly by the
people is diminishing. 5 At least the lower of the ordinary courts devote
33 Section 31 Des Gesetzes ilber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [hereinafter cited as B.
Verf. G.G.]. See also Statute on the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, Arts. 25, 29
(Dec. 24, 1963). The present writer has primarily used the German translation by
Eckhardt in '"Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Jugoslawien," Berichte des OsteuropaInstituts an der Freien Universitaet Berlin-Heft 66 (1965). This volume also contains
German translations of the statutes on the constitutional courts of the member states,
Serbia and Croatia, and of the rules of procedure of all three constitutional courts. Another
German translation of the Statute on the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia is printed
in "Wiener Quellenhefte zur Ostkunde," Reihe Recht, Heft 3 Beilage (1964). The translations show certain differences as do the translations of the Constitution cited note a supra.
34 See Sharma, supra note 29, at 5.
35 Cf. Eichenberger, Die richterliche Unabh-ngigkeit als staatsrechtliches Problem 224
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only a very small portion of their work to constitutional questions; hence
the designating process need not have so many political implications as
in the case of constitutional courts. The situation may be different at the
apex of the judicial pyramid. The fact that criminal and private law cases
usually predominate in the highest courts of the Commonwealth, while
the United States Supreme Court is chiefly engaged in questions of public
and largely of constitutional law, undoubtedly influences the differences
in the selecting process. Should the Commonwealth Supreme Courts
become as much constitutional courts as the United States Supreme Court
has been for a long time, the selection of judges by the executive alone,
a practice now prevailing in the Commonwealth, might not survive.
It is more interesting to note the number of judges on the specialized
constitutional courts and the authorities designating them. The tremendous political impact the decisions of these courts may have makes it
well-nigh impossible to choose the judges without any regard to their political background and affiliation. On the other hand, a specialized constitutional court can fulfill its task as guardian of the constitution only if it
is not the prolonged arm of some other state organ or of the political
parties. These considerations have usually had two effects: (1) the selecting agencies are prescribed in the constitution itself; (2) there is an
interplay of divergent constitutional and political forces to assure a certain balance in the courts.
Sometimes the necessity of decision by qualified majorities within the
selecting bodies secures this result. Of the fifteen members on the Italian
Constitutional Court, a third are chosen by representatives of the
judiciary, a third by the two chambers of Parliament in joint session, and
a third by the President of the Republic. The fifteen judges of the Constitutional Court in Turkey are called in a similar manner, although the
representatives of the judiciary elect eight. Eight of the now sixteen
members of the German Constitutional Court, which is unique as a "Twin
(constitutional) Court" sitting in two benches, each called "Senat," are
chosen by a special committee of the "Bundestag"; the other half, by the
plenum of the "Bundesrat."3 6 In both cases a qualified majority is
needed; in contrast to the selecting organ this majority is not prescribed
in the Constitution, but only by statute. Of the fourteen judges on the
Austrian Constitutional Court, the Federal Cabinet selects eight, and the
two chambers of Parliament, three each. Of the nine elected members of
the "Conseil Constitutionnel" in France, the Presidents of the Republic
(1960); Loewenstein, supra note 10, at 236. Eichenberger underlines the close connection
between the selection procedures and the independence of the judges. Id. at 219.
36 Cf. the explanation of the terms at text following note 53 infra.
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and of both chambers each select three. The former Presidents of the
Republic are ex officio members. In Cyprus the Greek President and the
Turkish Vice-President of the Republic must agree on one Greek and
on one Turkish judge, as well as on the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court, who must come from an impartial state. Only to the
most recent constitutional court, the Federal Yugoslavian, will the eleven
judges be elected by one organ. This organ is the Federal Chamber,
politically paramount among the five chambers of the Federal Assembly
(the supreme political and legislative body of the Federation). Under
articles 178 and 217 of the Constitution, the Federal Chamber acts after
the President of the Republic has made his recommendations.
(3) The difference between courts of general jurisdiction, only occasionally involved in constitutional law, and specialized constitutional
courts may considerably influence the choice of the individual judges.
McWhinney has stated:
On the whole, those nominated to serve as judges on the Supreme Courts
of the Commonwealth Countries tend to be the "complete," or allround,
lawyer with a high level of competence in most branches of law, but without the especial intellectual distinction that tends very often to come from
long specialisation [sic] in one particular field alone. Certainly .. .it is

unusual to find more than one or two judges on any one [Commonwealth
court who have any special feeling for, or expertise in, public
Supreme]
s7

law.

One may probably assume that the situation is similar in many of the
states without special constitutional courts, since the qualified all-round
lawyer answers best to most needs in courts of general jurisdiction. A case
in point is the contrast in the United States: although theoretically the
Supreme Court is as much a court of general jurisdiction as the lower
federal courts, in practice its work centers much more around constitutional law. This is probably largely due to limitations on the right of
appeal and to the manner in which the other cases for review are selected
by means of the writ of certiorari. This fact is certainly taken into
account in the selection of Supreme Court judges.38 On most specialized
constitutional courts, the judges must be jurists. The notable exception is
France; the atypical "Conseil Constitutionnel" may include members
without any legal background, and in practice this has been the case.39
87

Constitutional Review 81.

88 For the certiorari procedures and the applicability of their principles abroad, see

Vollkommer, 'Die Rechtsmittel zum U.S. Supreme Court-Beispiele flr eine Grundsatzrevision?" 19 Juristenzeitung 152 (1964). For the selection of judges, see Murphy & Pritchett,
Courts, Judges and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process 67 (1961); Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court-Its Politics, Personalities and Procedures 6 (1961).
39 See Buerstedde, supra note 4, at 150. Perhaps the strong criticism of certain of the
earliest appointments has later caused the selecting organs to choose some prominent jurists
from among law professors, high-ranking judges, and former ministers of justice.
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In some states the constitution or statutes limit eligibility to three or four
groups of jurists, i.e., active or retired judges, attorneys with fifteen or
twenty years of practice, and law professors (Italy and Turkey). Austria
admits all three groups, as well as higher civil servants. In Germany the
statute prescribes hardly any further qualifications beyond the eligibility
to any judgeship. A provision requiring special knowledge in public law
and experience in public life has been eliminated. In some states at least
some of the constitutional court members have been professional (career)
judges. On the German Constitutional Court six out of sixteen judges
must be selected from among members of the highest courts in the various
branches of the greatly specialized court system (the five federal courts
of (1) civil and criminal, (2) administrative, (3) social security, (4)
labor, and (5) tax law).* ° Similar results are reached at least in practice
by the Italian and Turkish election methods, since the representatives of
the judiciary participating in the selecting process are likely to take
41
candidates from their own ranks.

It seems wise to guarantee a certain amount of general judicial proficiency on a special constitutional court, particularly in regard to
procedural law. It is also useful to have at least some members accustomed through previous experience to exercise judicial objectivity, and
who have remained at a considerable distance from active politics. In this
respect the German, Italian, and Turkish election methods seem quite
satisfactory, the last perhaps even going too far. It is equally important
to have a certain expertise in constitutional law and considerable experience in public administration and/or political affairs represented on the
court. However, it would not be particularly helpful to have these qualifications prescribed by the constitution or by statute, since it is probable
that the electing organs will require even more in this direction than a
vague description of qualifications could demand.
The Constitutional Court in Germany may demonstrate how the
selecting process works. 41 Of the three Presidents this Court has had so

far,4" the first had for many years been a professional judge, later was
a state minister of finance and member of Parliament, after World War
II again was minister of finance, and was an honorary professor of law
See Kern, Gerichtsverfassungsrecht 187, 252 (3d ed. 1959).
According to Telchini, "La Cour Constitutionnelle en Italie," 15 Revue Internationale
de Droit Compar6 38 (1963) (Paris), the first Italian Constitutional Court included seven
judges, six law professors, and two attorneys; one of the latter was elected the first
president of the Court. It should be noted here that it took eight years until the Italian
Parliament agreed on the judges it had to choose.
42 As to the membership of the "Conseil Constitutionnel," see note 39 supra. As to the
United States Supreme Court, see Schmidhauser, supra note 38, at 30.
43 Two of the Presidents have died in office. The President of the Court always presides
over the first "Senat."
40
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and member of the council that drafted the Bonn Constitution. The
second President had been a life-long professional judge and had before
his appointment to the Constitutional Court presided over a court of
appeal in his home state. The incumbent President was a professional
judge until the end of World War II and was later Minister of Justice
and Prime Minister in his home state. Both Vice-Presidents (who preside
over the second "Senat" of the Court) have in turn been practicing
attorneys and active in political life as parliamentarians for many years.
One was a state minister as well. Both belonged to the council which drew
up the Constitution. Each was chosen on the recommendation of the
opposition party, while the Presidents have so far been recommended by
the parties of the parliamentary majority. Of the other fourteen judges
now on the Court, seven have served mainly as professional judges, two
as attorneys (both with experience either as state minister and/or parliamentarian), three in the higher ranks of the civil service, and one
(three until 1963) as a professor of law.44 One judge has been in academic
life as well as in the administration and the judiciary. To the AngloAmerican observer, the balance may look somewhat tipped against the
jurists who obtained their legal experience outside any governmental
branch; but in Germany the present composition of the courts has not
been subject to tny noteworthy public criticism in this regard.
As to political affiliation, only the minority of the judges has been active
in political parties. One may state though that usually the judges are
recommended by the representatives of different political parties in the
electing organs. The need to secure a qualified majority in the selecting
bodies automatically causes a balance of political forces and guarantees
appointments from different directions. There is some contrast to the
United States Supreme Court, where mainly the passage of time, in other
words, the succession of Presidents, creates a balance. So far experience
seems to prove that political associations of the judges existing before the
appointment submerge in the new responsibility. In Germany early speculation about a "red" (Social Democratic) and a "black" (Christian
Democratic) "Senat" of the Federal Constitutional Court soon proved
unjustified.
It need not be stressed that the selection process in a one-party-system
state like Yugoslavia can hardly guarantee a balance of varying political
persuasions on the Constitutional Court.
(4) Specialized courts guarding the constitution are more likely than
other courts to be drawn deeply into the power struggle. Therefore the
44

For a comparison with Italy, see note 41 supra.
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judges are even more in need of independence than their brethren on
courts of general jurisdiction. While the latter in most states serve during
their lifetimes or to a certain retirement age, this is not the case with all
specialized constitutional courts. In Austria, Turkey, and Cyprus (in the
latter, the President with a mere six-year term excepted) the judges
remain in office up to a designated age; in France and Italy they are
elected for nine- or twelve-year periods respectively; in Yugoslavia for
eight years; Yugoslavia allows one reelection; Italy does not permit immediate reelection; France, none whatsoever. In Germany the six judges
who must be taken from the professional judiciary serve to the age of
sixty-eight. The remaining ten, the President and Vice-President included,
hold office for eight years. Reelection was customary until the election of
judges in 1963, which coincided with a legally-prescribed decrease of the
court membership to the present sixteen judges (the final goal being a
one-chamber court). In the states where judges are elected for a certain
number of years, the terms are usually staggered.
The advantages of a limited term seem more than outweighed by the
resulting jeopardy to the judges' independence. Even if, as in France, no
second term is possible, this will not eliminate the dangers. To most
Anglo-American observers, tenure during lifetime or until voluntary
resignation might seem the wisest course, and Europeft jurists accustomed to a professional judiciary would probably prefer tenure to a retirement age of sixty-eight or seventy.
III
PREvious JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES BY MEANS OF ADVISORY
OPINIONS OR BINDING DECISIONS

(1) At first sight previous review of statutes seems somewhat sur-

prising, as it takes place before a statute's official publication-in other
words, before the statute really exists. Previous review sounds particularly
unfamiliar to those Anglo-American observers accustomed to judicial
control only in the context of a concrete case or controversy, and only in
regard to a statute with a direct legal bearing on the case which an unpublished statute cannot possibly have. The picture changes though if we (1)
include the more familiar advisory opinions, and (2) remember that in
some states proceedings before specialized constitutional courts may be
initiated by certain government organs. These proceedings may lead to
judicial review of statutes although they might have nothing to do with
possible infringements on individual rights or interests or with other
reasons for a. case or controversy in the usual sense of the word. The
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decisions rendered in these special proceedings may result in a binding
declaration on the constitutionality of an adopted statute, thus preventing
its publication. Here we have a full-fledged judicial review which can,
from the constitutional and political point of view, be more important
than a later subsequent control of the constitutionality (e.g., in Cyprus)
or even be the only judicial review available (e.g., in France). Although
we find judicial review in its narrow sense only in proceedings resulting
in binding decisions, we cannot altogether overlook the mere advisory
opinions. 45 The latter may in practice lead to the same consequences as
binding decisions, namely, prevention of the publication of a statute
already adopted by the legislature. The advisory opinions may thus render
judicial review in its subsequent form superfluous in the opinion of the
constitution drafters and the courts. When we speak in this particular
context of a statute, we mean-there being no indication to the contrary
-a bill adopted by the legislature, but not yet officially published by the
competent authority, and, therefore, not yet in force.
(2) We are concerned here neither with the examination of bills within
the legislature, nor by the head of state entitled to investigate the constitutionality before sanctioning or vetoing a statute, although both may
in practice be more important than any judicial review.4 6 Both authorities
are involved in the legislative process themselves. The control the legislature may exercise is simply self-control. Even the position of the head
of state is quite different from the one courts or outside advisory bodies
have. We want, however, at least to note some examples of reviewing
activities by nonjudicial authorities which are not per se integrated in the
legislative process.
Sweden has the "Lagrd," a council consisting of three judges of the
highest general court and one judge of the highest administrative court,
all elected by the membership of these courts. The cabinet may ask the
"Lagr~d" for an advisory opinion on any bill. In certain important fields
(e.g., general criminal and private law) the submission of bills is obligatory. The review covers the entire bill under all legal aspects, including
its constitutionality. The cabinet must submit the opinion of the "Lagr .d"
45 The subject of advisory opinions extends far beyond the scope of this article. We
can only illustrate through some examples how advisory opinions serve as a substitute
for, or a supplement to, judicial review of statutes in the usual sense. We must even exclude
such states as Canada and India. The reader may gain an excellent picture from two
articles which complement each other: Imboden, "Bedeutung und Problematik juristischer
Gutachten," Ius et Lex-Festgabe fUr M. Gutzwiller 503 (1959); Note, "Advisory
Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1302 (1956). See also
the recent monograph, Wildhaber, Advisory opinions-Rechtsgutachten h6chster Gerichte
(1962).
46 See Saario, "Control of the Constitutionality of Laws in Finland," 12 Am. '. Comp.
L. 194, 196 (1963).
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to the legislature. Although not binding, this advice enjoys high prestige.
It has, however, not been followed in all cases where the "Lagrfd" has
questioned the constitutionality of the proposed statute.
Switzerland offers a probably singular example of real preventive control by a political organ over the constitutionality of even a constitution.
The "Kantone" (member states) of Switzerland are under constitutional
obligation to ask the federation to guarantee their constitutions. Reasonably enough, the guarantee is given to new constitutional provisions only
if they conform with federal law, in particular with the Federal Constitution. It is the task of the Federal Assembly, the highest constitutional and
political organ of the federation, to review new state constitutions before
they take effect. The decision is binding and precludes any later court
review. The Federal Assembly may, however, later reverse itself.4"
These examples suffice to show that previous control of laws with
statutory or even higher rank may fall to non-judicial bodies of divergent
character and may lead to more or less effective results.
(3) For examples of previous judicial review of statutes through
advisory opinions or binding court decisions, we might look at Austria,
Colombia, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway.4 9 In
all of these states the previous control is based directly on the constitution.
As to Yugoslavia, it is still not possible to form an entirely clear picture.
According to Article 241, Paragraph 1 of the Yugoslav Constitution, the
Federal Constitutional Court is to review the constitutionality of statutes.
Article 242 empowers it to follow events of interest for the realization of
constitutionality and to make proposals, among other purposes, for the
safeguarding of the Constitution. In regard to this question, Article 3 of
the Statute on the Constitutional Court is a mere repetition of Article 242
of the Constitution. Neither do the Rules of Procedure of June 13, 1964,
which the Court adopted under Article 16 of this statute, clarify whether
any previous review of statutes exists.
(a) We may first note that previous review of statutes is entrusted only
to the highest judicial organs. In Austria, Cyprus, and Germany, the task
falls to the specialized constitutional courts; in France, to the "Conseil
Constitutionnel"; in Colombia, to the Supreme Court; in Finland and
Cf. Herlitz, Constitutional Review 493.
See Imboden, Constitutional Review 506, 508; Cereghetti, Die Vberpriifung der Kantonsverfassung durch die Bundesversammlung und das Bundesgericht (1956). In Yugoslavia
under Art. 244 of the Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court shall advise the
Federal Assembly as to whether the constitution of a republic is at variance with the
Constitution of Yugoslavia. Under Article 18 of the Statute on the Constitutional Court,
the Court acts either upon the request of the Federal Assembly or of its own accord.
49 All these states are examined in Constitutional Review. n addition, for Norway, see
Hiorthoy, "Hoyesteretts betenkninger," Legal Essays-A Tribute to F. Castberg 458 (1963).
For Finland, France and Italy, see the articles cited notes 4, 41 & 46 supra.
47
48
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Norway, to the highest courts of general jurisdiction. This is not surprising. The question submitted is usually of great importance and merits
an answer by a state organ of the highest authority. If the result of the
examination is binding, there can, of course, be only one answer. Diverging opinions by different authorities might cause problems even if the
opinions are not binding, as, for instance, in Finland and Norway. Yet
in Finland the Highest Administrative Court may also be consulted. In
other respects there are wide dissimilarities from state to state.
(b) The divergencies begin with the question of whether all or only
certain statutes may or must be referred for previous judicial review.
In Austria, Colombia, Finland, France, and Norway previous review
authorized by the constitution may extend as a matter of principle to all
statutes; in France and Austria, to international treaties as well. With
regard to the French "lois organiques," judicial review is obligatory.50
In Cyprus it is given wide scope, but is subject to some limitations too
intricate to be explained here. In Italy previous review is restricted to the
statutes of the autonomous local units with legislative powers (regions
and two provinces). In Germany direct previous control is open only for
statutes approving those treaties, which under the Constitution require
legislative assent. This single exception to the German rule of exclusive
subsequent review51 is due to the particular nature of these statutes under
German law: They authorize the President to ratify the treaty and also
transform its content into internal law. The annulling by the Constitutional Court of an unconstitutional statute in later (subsequent)
proceedings would not eliminate the obligations under international law,
but make it illegal internally to fulfill them. 2 To avoid this dilemma the
Constitutional Court has, despite the wording of Article 93, Paragraph 1,
Number 2 of the Constitution, permitted judicial review at an earlier
stage, namely after the adoption of the statute by the legislature.5
The very extensive system of judicial review in Germany also makes
an indirect previous control of statutes possible. Under Article 93, Paragraph 1, Number 1 of the Constitution, the highest organs of the state
may challenge any infringement on their constitutional rights before the
Constitutional Court. Thus the "Bundesrat" (the federal organ through
which the "Lainder" participate in the legislation and administration of
50 Art. 61, Para. 1 of the Constitution. For Austria, cf. von Gruenigen, 'Die oesterreichische

Verfassungsnovelle ueber Staatsvertraege vom 4. Maerz 1964," 25 Z.AB. R.V. 76, 91 (1965).
51 Cf. Parts V-VII of the text infra.
52 Cf. Geck, 'Die v~lkerrechtiichen Wirkungen verfassungswidriger Vertriige-Zugleich
ein Beitrag zum Vertragsschluss im Verfassungsrecht der Staatenwelt," 38 Beitr'ge zum
ausl~ndischen 5ffentlichen Recht und V61kerrecht, passim (1963).
53 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 396 (1952) (Ger. Fed. Rep.) [hereinafter cited as B. Verf. G.E.].
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the Federal Republic, consisting of cabinet members of the "Linder")
may attack the adoption of a statute by the "Bundestag" (the federal
Parliament, elected in general, direct, secret, free and equal elections) for
violating its right to approve or disapprove of the draft. Here the objection is directed not to the still unpublished statute, but to the mere fact
of its adoption. Some attempts to expand previous review even further
have failed in the Constitutional Court. Its statutory power to give
advisory opinions at the request of the President of the Republic, and
jointly of the "Bundestag," "Bundesrat," and the Federal Cabinet, which
had been questioned by some on constitutional grounds, was upheld by
the Court,5" but abrogated in 1955 by the legislature. The reason is rather
interesting: the President of the Republic had asked the plenum of the
Court for an advisory opinion; simultaneously almost the same question
was pending before one "Senat" of the Court in adversary proceedings.
To avoid diverging results, the plenum resolved that its advisory opinion
would be binding, not on the President of the Republic, but internally on
the "Senat" that had to decide the pending case.5 5 Hereupon the President, who had merely wanted advice, but nothing prejudicial, withdrew
his request; this in turn led to the abolishment of the statutory provision
permitting advisory opinions.56
(c) Previous review of statutes may also be limited to specific constitutional issues. Thus, in Cyprus, the Constitution reserves the question of
an alleged infringement by statutes on the rights of either the Greek population or the Turkish minority exclusively to subsequent judicial control.
In Austria previous control of statutes is restricted to one issue: has the
legislature of the republic or the legislature of a member state overstepped
its competence at the expense of the other?
The question whether the state organ initiating previous review may
limit it to certain parts of the statute hardly permits a general statement.
The answer is likely to be affirmative in countries such as Finland and
Norway, where reference of the question to the court is voluntary and
the opinion not binding, i.e., in purely advisory opinions. In France the
applicant may also limit review by the "Conseil Constitutionnel" with
binding force except in the cases of the "lois organiques," the examination
of which is made obligatory by the Constitution. In Germany the Federal
Constitutional Court is generally confined to the application, but may void
54 2 B. Verf. G.E. 79, 86 (1952). As to the basic problems of advisory opinions in general,
see the articles cited note 45 supra.
55 2 B. Verf. G.E. 79, 90 (1952).
56 For the political background of these events and the ensuing attacks against the
Court, see Friesenhahn, Constitutional Review 89, 130.
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other parts of the statute if they are unconstitutional for the same
reason as those parts submitted for review."
(d) By far the most important limitation of previous review is caused
by the constitutional rules circumscribing the right to institute these
proceedings. Except in France, where the "Conseil Constitutionnel" is
under a time limit, the proceedings are likely to consume some time. As
they also have far-reaching effects, it seems natural that they should be
initiated only by state organs which participate directly in the legislative
process or have a particular responsibility for upholding the constitution.
In Finland only the President of the Republic may request an advisory
opinion; in Norway, only the "Storthing" (Parliament). In Austria the
Federal Cabinet or the executive of the member states may go to the
Constitutional Court; in Italy, only the Italian Cabinet may challenge
the constitutionality of regional or provincial statutes. In France, the
presidents of each legislative chamber and the Prime Minister may apply
to the "Conseil Constitutionnel." As in other respects, the applicable constitutional rule in Cyprus reflects the deep cleavage between the two
ethnic groups of the population. Depending on the constitutional issue at
band, either the (Greek) President or the (Turkish) Vice-President, or
both, may institute proceedings. In Germany the statutes approving
treaties may be challenged by the federal or a state cabinet or by onethird of the "Bundestag." The latter group has taken this opportunity a
few times. In the cases of an indirect previous control of statutes,58 Article
93, Paragraph 1, Number 1 of the Constitution also limits the right to
start these proceedings.
Wherever the expected court opinion is purely advisory, it seems to be
implied that the right to request it should be optional. Reasons of political
expediency and respect for the dignity of the highest state organs would
lead to the same results in most other countries. There are nevertheless
exceptions: In Colombia the President's veto of a statute on constitutional
grounds can, if the legislature insists on the statute without however
obtaining a qualified majority to overcome the veto, be overruled only
by resort to the Supreme Court.59 In France a certain group of higherranking statutes, namely the "lois organiques," cannot become effective
before having been reviewed by the "Conseil Constitutionnel. ' '60
Section 78 B. Verf. G.G.
58 See Part 111(3) (b) of the text supra.
59 Similar procedures, provided there is no qualified majority to overcome the president's
veto, exist for example in Ecuador, Panama, and Ireland. Cf. Engelhardt, "Das richterliche
Priifungsrecht im modernen Verfassungsstaat," 8 J.R.
101, 120 (1959).
60 Cf. Buerstedde, "Kontrolle der rechtsetzenden Gewalt durch den Conseil constitutionnel und Conseil d'Etat nach Der franzdsischen Verfassung vom 4.10.1958," 12 J.6.R. 145,.
57

155 (1963).
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(e) As indicated by the term "previous review," the statute is to be
examined before its official publication. Problems may nevertheless arise
in view of the earliest possible date for its submission to the competent
court. The laws and practice of the states under consideration differ
somewhat. In Norway, where advisory opinions are not restricted to the
constitutionality of statutes, and possibly also in Finland, drafts may be
presented to the court before their final adoption by the legislature. The
same rule applies to Austria, and in the case of Article 41 of the Constitution, to France. In Austria these proceedings serve to demarcate the
legislative competences between the Federal Republic and its member
states; in France, between Parliament and the executive, which has a
legislative power of its own. Since the decisions in the last two states are
binding, it would seem more practical to obtain a final ruling only on a
finished legislative product. Everywhere else a statute's definite adoption
by the legislature must precede submission to the courts. There may
even be additional prerequisites, as in Colombia, where Parliament first
has to decide against the veto of the President.
Under some constitutions there is a time limit for applications to the
court, in order to prevent undue uncertainty and delays in the legislative
process. In France,6' and with one exception in Italy, the time limit is
fifteen days from the adoption of the statute.
(f) The procedures before the courts depend largely on the effect of
the opinion or decision. In Finland and Norway, where the courts render
only advisory opinions in the traditional sense, contentious (adversary)
procedures seem out of place.62 The situation may be different in states
where a binding court decision will prevent a statute adopted by the
legislature from coming into force. Here we may note two main categories
of procedures. In contentious proceedings the applicants stand in the
position of real parties in interest and are procedurally treated as such.
On the other hand in the so-called objective proceedings, the decision is,
at least theoretically, not concerned with the constitutional rights or
powers of the applicant or of the legislature which has adopted the statute,
but with the preservation of the constitution. Thus the applicant may offer
opinions and make procedural suggestions, but he is not a party in the
usual sense of the word. Italy is an example of contentious proceedings
through suits of the Italian Cabinet against provinces or regions; France,
of objective proceedings; Germany has both types: the direct previous
control of statutes approving a treaty takes place in objective pro61 Cf. arts. 10, 61, para. 4.
62 For the procedures in state courts of the United States, see Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
1302 (1956).
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ceedings; the indirect previous control" is actually a struggle between the
highest state organs in contentious proceedings.
Although oral arguments are permitted in some states, decisions seem
to be reached more frequently only on a written basis.
As long as the request leading to a binding decision is pending, the
statute must remain unpublished and ineffective. In France the Constitution has set an unusual time limit for the deliberations of the "Conseil
Constitutionnel," which must reach a decision either within eight days64
or within a month. 65 In the latter instances, the deadline will be shortened
to eight days if the executive requires this in urgent cases. It is obvious
that these constitutional regulations may render the previous review less
thorough, and perhaps less effective.
(4) We have included the advisory opinions of the highest courts in
Finland and Norway because they may in practice lead to almost the same
results as previous review of statutes by means of binding court decisions.
They may (1) have an inhibiting effect on the legislatures in general, and
(2) in particular cases prevent them from adopting a draft (Norway) or
prevent the President of the Republic from sanctioning the draft despite
its adoption (Finland). In Norway it is considered unlikely that the
"Storthing" will disregard an advisory opinion. 66 In Finland, where other
important methods of examining the legislative drafts exist, advisory
opinions seem to enjoy similar prestige and have caused the President to
veto a statute at least twice.6 7
Nevertheless these results rely mainly on tradition, the prestige of the
courts, and the expectation that they will not have to face violent opposition in matters of great political importance. Thus, one should hesitate
to generalize. Besides, non-binding advisory opinions finding a statute
constitutional and leading to its adoption can hardly preclude later subsequent review in a concrete case.
Only a control leading to a binding decision and hence preventing the
publication of an unconstitutional statute is really on a par with subsequent review. In fact it is stronger than incidental (or collateral) subsequent review. We find examples in Austria, Cyprus, France, Italy, and
also in Colombia, where the Constitution declares that the unconstitu63 Cf. Part 111(3) (b) of the text supra.
64 Article 41 of the Constitution.

65 Article 61 of the Constitution.
66 It should be noted however that the Supreme Court has only rarely been asked for an
advisory opinion. Cf. Hiorthoy, supra note 49.
67 In Finland, where the courts are not entitled to exercise subsequent review, but are
bound to apply any duly promulgated and published statute, they are authorized to
make proposals to the President of the Republic for the abrogation of statutes they consider unconstitutional.
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tional statute "will go to the archives." In France, however, the President
may omit the unconstitutional norms and sanction and publish the
remainder of the statute, provided both, parts are not inextricably
involved. In Germany one differentiates between the direct previous control of statutes approving a treaty and the indirect control in suits
between the highest organs of the state ("Organstreitigkeiten") under
Article 93, Paragraph 1, Number 1 of the Constitution.6 8 In the first case
a statute is to be voided expressis verbis; in the second the court states
the unconstitutionality of the "Bundestag" resolution which had adopted
it. If in the second example the statute has not already been sanctioned
and published, the effect will be the same: the statute will not enter the
statute books. If, however, the statute is already on the books, the legislature must repeal it.
It is logical that a binding court decision declaring a statute constitutional in the course of previous review will preclude any later judicial
control on the same point. This is, for instance, the case in France and
Germany. In Austria, the examination is limited to delineating the legislative powers of the republic and its member states. In so far as the
decision is considered the authoritative interpretation of the Constitution
with the force of a "Verfassungsgesetz," i.e., a statute of the same rank
as the Constitutio, the decision must be published like a statute. But
subsequent review concerning a possible violation of basic constitutional
rights is not excluded.
(5) Although the different forms of legally-binding previous review
sketched above all serve to safeguard the constitution, they have, at least
in practice, rather specific, and more limited goals.
In Italy and Austria only certain federal aspects are to be decided. In
Italy the interest of the nation as a whole requires some means to keep
provincial and regional legislation within their constitutional limits. It
might endanger local autonomy, however, if this task were left to the
legislature or executive in Rome. The Constitutional Court therefore
serves as the neutral arbiter. Mutatis mutandis the same considerations
apply to Austria, although the republic and its member states are on an
equal footing and both the federal and the state executives may institute
proceedings.
In Colombia previous review serves primarily as a judicial means to
solve a constitutional and political struggle between the executive and the
legislature. In France previous judicial control seems to aim mainly at
keeping Parliament in line.69 Although the French Constitution grants
68 Cf. Part II(3) (b) of the text supra.

69 Cf. the very critical evaluation of the French system by Buerstedde, supra note 60,
at 197.
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the executive a wide law-making authority of its own, independent of
parliamentary delegation, only the formal statutes of Parliament are
subject to previous judicial review. The "Conseil Constitutionnel" has
denied its competence to examine a statute adopted by means of a referendum, thus further strengthening the executive. The subsequent control
by the "Conseil d'Rtat" probably does notsubject the legislative products
of the executive to the same degree of supervision which the "Conseil
Constitutionnel" exercises over the formal statutes passed by Parliament.
The notion that the jurisdiction of the "Conseil Constitutionnel" is mainly
tailored to protect the constitutional powers of the executive against
Parliament seems affirmed by the fact that only the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, and the presidents of each chamber may
submit a statute to the "Conseil." As the president of at least one house
is likely to have the same political affiliations as the executive, the balance
rather swings to one side. Attempts to give a certain minority of each
chamber the constitutional right of applying to the "Conseil Constitutionnel" were defeated.
In Germany, where the parliamentary minority (one-third of the members) and the "Linder" cabinets may directly challenge the constitutionality of a statute approving a treaty, and have-thus far
unsuccessfully-done so, their motive is usually a special interest in the
preservation of state (as against federal) power, or opposition to the
policies of the federal executive and its parliamentary majority in Bonn.
In indirect previous control based on Article 93, Paragraph 1, Number 1
of the Constitution" the situation is not fundamentally different. Thus
we may probably say that in the states mentioned here, Cyprus possibly
excepted, previous judicial control of statutes with binding effect cannot
sufficiently safeguard the constitution as a whole. The main gap left open
is the protection of individual rights granted by the constitution. It should
be noted, however, that the French Constitution does not contain a basicrights section, and thus the main question open to judicial review, namely
the distribution of legislative competence between Parliament and the
executive, is covered by previous review.
The institution of previous judicial review of statutes has certain
advantages and disadvantages. There is, on the positive side, the fact that
a binding decision before publication may exclude any doubts on the
constitutionality of the statutory provisions reviewed; no further challenges will be necessary or even possible in these cases. The awkward
results of a later court decision finding the statute unconstitutional will
be avoided; in particular the court engaged in previous review does not
70 Cf. Part M (3) (b) of the text supra.
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need to fear the consequences of a decision voiding the statute ab initio,
a factor that might well weaken judicial determination. 71 Furthermore,
the prestige of parliament suffers less from a negative decision on an unpublished and thus far ineffective statute. We should be aware, however,
that these advantages apply only so far as previous judicial investigation
goes. In a federal system limiting it, for instance, to questions of legislative competence between the federation and the member states, subsequent review on other points could only be excluded at the cost of
rendering judicial review incomplete.
The main disadvantages of previous control resulting in binding decisions seem to be the following. The procedures may be time-consuming.
If, on the other hand, a time limit is set, it should not be so short as in
France, where it might really impair the effectiveness of review. The examination of a statute on a purely abstract basis cannot rely on practical
experiences. The executive authorities and the courts might later apply
and interpret the statute in conformity with the constitution, thus salvaging it, although it would have seemed unconstitutional, viewed abstractly.
A court exercising previous review will hardly be able to foresee all possibilities of application and interpretation in conformity with the constitution. The lack of executive and judicial experience with the statute in
question might also prove a drawback under more general aspects. Without such experience, the court engaged in previous control will find it
more difficult to assess the practical impact of the statute; it will lack the
benefit of former judicial evaluation and of the reaction to decisions of
lower courts. These circumstances might contribute to a premature decision, perhaps regrettable in the light of later events.
If one may venture such a general statement, previous judicial review
resulting in binding decisions seems best suited to statutes approving
international treaties or to the treaties themselves. 2 Here it offers the
only judicial way to prevent international obligations of unconstitutional,
and therefore irredeemable character on the state. Further in its favor
is the reluctance of courts to find an already effective treaty provision
unconstitutional. Not only are they apt to resort to the (unobjectionable)
"verfassungskonforme Vertragsauslegung" (a treaty interpretation conforming to the constitution), but also to the rather dubious "vertragskonforme Verfassungsauslegung," i.e., tailoring the constitution to the needs
of the treaty.73 This latter would render judicial review practically useless.
71 Cf. Part V(3) (c) of the text infra.
72 This opinion was forcefully expressed at the International Conference in Heidelberg.
See Constitutional Review 767, 780, 782.
73 For this problem, see Geck, 23 Zeitschrift ffir ausliindisches 5ffentliches Recht und
VSlkerrecht 557 (1963); Geck, supra note 52, at 216; Hauri, 'Die Verfassungsm'fssigkeit
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In delimitating legislative competences, previous judicial review may,
depending on the form it takes, serve as a helpful tool. It seems of rather
doubtful value, however, as a substitute for subsequent review in the wide
and important field of securing individual constitutional rights. This is
borne out by the additional provisions for subsequent control of statutes
in most constitutions mentioned so far.
IV
SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL REv W INCIDENTAL TO THE DECISION OF A CASE

(1) Most frequent among the different forms of subsequent judicial
control of statutes is an examination incidental to the decision of a case.
It takes place in the usual court jurisdiction without any special proceedings, and only if the result of a pending case depends on the constitutionality of a statute. As the constitutional issue is merely a preliminary for
the decision, it cannot be raised before the publication of the statute.7 4
The oldest instance and probably the most interesting experiences are
offered by the United States. The examination by the Privy Council of
Dominion and colonial legislation has devolved upon the supreme courts
of most Commonwealth countries; the influence of the American legal
system and its Supreme Court's prestige have also contributed there to
the development of incidental judicial review. Similar practices of judicial
review prevail in most Latin American countries. Denmark, Norway,
Japan, the Philippines, and Liberia are further illustrations. In Sweden
judicial review of statutes is controversial; so far no statute has been
found unconstitutional by a court. In so large a group of states there are
naturally divergencies, e.g., regarding whether and how a state can- be
sued without its consent (state immunity; Shield-of-the-Crown doctrine) .75 But as the common features predominate, it is possible to ascer7
tain typical aspects. 6

(2) We should first remember that most of these countries have a
court system with no considerable degree of specialization and with only
one supreme court. In contrast for instance to the highly specialized court
structure in Germany, 77 courts of general jurisdiction decide most types of
cases, from criminal and private law to attacks against governmental actions and claims for social security or other benefits. Some exceptions,
der Staatsvertrdge. Uber die inhaltliche Bindung der vertragschliessender Gewalt an die
Verfassung" (1962).
74 For one of the few exceptions, see McWbinney, Constitutional Review 79, 83.
76 Cf. Kauper, Constitutional Review 568, 599, 621; McWhinney, id. at 85.
76 In Constitutional Review the following states of this category are examined: Argentina,
Colombia, Denmark, Japan, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, and the United States. The
Commonwealth is covered by a collective survey.
77 Cf. Kern, supra note 40.
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such as the Court of Patent and Custom Appeals in the United States, do
not substantially alter this picture. In many states of this group judicial
review of statutes is prescribed expressis verbis in the constitution, e.g.,
in numerous Latin American countries, 7 Japan, and South Africa. In the
majority, however, it is derived from the constitution by means of interpretation, as, for instance, in the United States, most Commonwealth
countries, Argentina, Denmark, Liberia, Norway, and the Philippines.
The United States may again serve as a model for the underlying principles common to the latter group. Practice and theory predominant there
hold that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, that it outranks ordinary statute law, that it is binding on all national and state
authorities including the courts, and that the courts are legally obliged to
consider the cases before them in the light of all law binding on them,
measuring such law if necessary against the Constitution as the highest
norm.79 As the Constitution does not exempt any tribunal, this task extends from the United States Supreme Court down to any municipal
judge. In most other states as well, a court's position in the judicial pyramid has no bearing on its power to examine a statute. This does not necessarily mean that each court must always decide the issue itself. In the
United States the federal courts of appeal may certify constitutional as
well as other questions of law to the Supreme Court in order to receive
instructions. Nevertheless this practice is neither obligatory nor very
frequently followed.80
In most states of this group the fact that the constitutionality of a
statute is at stake8l does not affect the procedures or the composition of
the court. We find an illustration of an exception in the United States:
In proceedings to enjoin enforcement of a statute as unconstitutional,
there is, instead of the one-judge federal district court, an especially convened court of three judges. The Norwegian Supreme Court presents
another deviation from the rule; the plenum rather than one of the usual
benches decides on the constitutionality of a statute.8 2 Furthermore, if
in any case pending before a United States federal court the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest is questioned, and
78 Cf. note 26 supra.

79 -Cf.the authorities cited note 1 supra. For Germany under the Constitution of 1919,
cf. the authorities cited note 19 supra.
80 For these and other procedural questions, see Stem & Gressman, Supreme Court
Practice (2d ed. 1954). In Australia and Canada, the question of a statute's constitutionality is under certain circumstances to be submitted to the supreme court. See Engelhardt,
supra note 59, at 110. As to India, see Sharma, supra note 29, at 12. The procedures are
somewhat related to the submission of the constitutional question to a specialized constitutional court. Cf. Part V of the text infra.
81 The question whether the statute itself is under attack or only its application in a
specific case may raise some difficulties. See, e.g., Kauper, Constitutional Review 615, 617.
82 As to India, see Sharma, The Supreme Court in the Indian Constitution 5 (1959).
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neither the United States nor one of its agencies is already a party, the
court shall advise the United States Attorney General. He may then intervene in order to have the arguments in favor of the statute adequately
presented.
A decision finding a statute unconstitutional will usually be appealed.
Again, in most states of this category, no special rules exist. If, however,
the three-judge court just mentioned considers a statute unconstitutional,
there is a right to appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court. The
situation is similar if the constitutionality of a federal statute is attacked
in a criminal case before a federal court. Furthermore, if the highest
court of a state holds a federal statute or treaty to be unconstitutional, the
party adversely affected by the state court's decision is entitled to an
appeal to the Supreme Court instead of being limited to a mere application for certiorari."3 The reason is obvious: the constitutionality of a
statute is usually so important as to necessitate a final decision of the
highest tribunal within the shortest possible time.
As a rule all statutes are subject to judicial examination. In some
countries certain exceptions exist. Hence in Argentina, the admission of a
religious order or the declaration of war by the President require legislative assent in the form of a statute, and statutes of this kind, being law
only in a formal sense, are not open to judicial control. In some states
of this grouping, as for instance in the United States, Argentina, 4 and
other Latin American countries, international treaties may be reviewed
as to their constitutionality even though they need not be approved by
or transformed into a formal statute. In Colombia, Denmark, Japan, and
Norway the question of treaty revieW does not appear to be definitely
settled.
(3) Judicial review of statutes incidental to the decision of a case is,
as the name implies, less a goal in itself than a means to an end. The nonspecialized courts we are dealing with here are to safeguard the constitution only insofar as it is necessary to mete out justice in individual controversies. Their responsibility as guardians of the constitution appears more
limited than that of some recent specialized constitutional courts which
have been given a wider jurisdiction through special proceedings. The
development of judicial review of statutes under Article III of the United
States Constitution and the parallels in many countries have not eliminated the basic concept of courts as interpreters of the law in a given
case. Probably more important than traditions are the political ideas and
83 For the problems connected with appeal versus certiorari, cf. Stem & Gressman,
supra note 80; Vollkomnner, supra note 38.
84 There are certain exceptions. Cf. Barberis, Constitutional Review 45, 57.
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realities determining the role of the judiciary in the various modern democratic societies with a separation of powers. These factors are to varying
degrees reflected in the manner in which the courts of this group delimit
judicial review of statutes in practice. It is impossible to treat the guiding
principles in all countries; the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court will suffice. It has laid down some basic propositions which
may demonstrate the main trends:
The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary, proceeding: to decide such questions is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals.
The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. No one has the
right to challenge
a statute without being affected in his personal or prop85
eirty rights.
If the case may be disposed of on some other ground, the Court will not
decide the constitutional question; it will not anticipate it before the decision is necessary.
The Court will formulate a rule of constitutional law only so far as the
precise facts of the case require it. Even if serious doubts against a statute
passed by Congress are raised, the Court will first ascertain whether an
interpretation
of the statute is fairly possible which may avoid the ques86
tion.

These statements naturally permit some exceptions. Thus, for example,
the Supreme Court has relaxed the rule that only a person impaired in
a valid right or personal interest has standing to challenge a statute; it
has allowed persons to assert the rights of others provided they were
7
nearly identical with their own rights.1
The broad rules developed by the Supreme Court may sometimes need
interpretation. Yet despite these reservations and certain divergencies
within this category, the fundamentals are valid in most states. This is
due to a common basic concept of the nature of the judicial process.
Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court in 1947 described the source
of these principles approximately as follows:
[Their ultimate foundations lie in the delicacy of judicial review,] particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from
85 It may be noted here that legal persons organized on a public-law basis,-e.g.,
municipal corporations, or even the member states of a federal state-may seek judicial
redress against the legislature's violation of their property rights. See, e.g., Kauper, Constitutional Review 589; McWhinney, Constitutional Review 83. In the Commonwealth it is
not entirely impossible that a member state will be granted access to the courts if the federal
state is interfering with its constitutional competence, and vice versa. Cf., e.g., Art. 131 of
the Indian Constitution; Sharma, supra note 82, at 21.
86 These principles are an abbreviated version of justice Brandeis' concurring opinion
in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936).
87 Cf. Kauper, Constitutional Review 618.

1966]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES

constitutional roots; the comparative finality of these consequences; the
consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional
power concerning the scope of their authority; the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power,
including the courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising
especially from its largely negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system. 8
One may assume that these considerations will suggest at least the same
degree of judicial self-restraint under constitutions with parliamentary
governments and a less clear-cut separation of powers than in the United
States. This would particularly apply to most states of the Commonwealth.
(4) The primary concern of the courts with individual controversies
is reflected in the effects of a judgment finding a statute unconstitutional.
In contrast to judicial review by specialized constitutional courts as illustrated in Austria, Germany and Italy, there is no decree with general
applicability striking down the statute. Instead it will remain on the
statute books unless repealed through ordinary legislative process, being
treated as non-existent only in the pending case. If the norm was the
basis for a criminal indictment, this must be dismissed; if it was to justify
a private-law claim, the claimant will lose his suit; if the enforcement of
an administrative act depended on it, the court will deny the enforcement
order. Although stricto sensu the decision of a constitutional question is
binding only on the parties, its impact may in practice extend much
further. The principle of stare decisis would usually lead to an identical
result in other suits under the same statute.8 9 Thus criminal sanctions or a
grant of authority to an administrative agency might in practice be unenforceable, and therefore useless. In exceptional cases, however, the
statute might, if not revoked by the legislature, be revived, should the
courts in later proceedings consider the governing circumstances changed,
or simply reverse themselves. The practical consequences of the decision
will be more limited if the statute has not been found void on its face, i.e.,
under any conditions, but only in its operation in this particular instance.
Somewhere between a general effect and the confinement merely to one
case are judgments holding a statute unconstitutional in its application to
certain classes or groups of people.
If a statute has been pronounced unconstitutional, questions may arise
as to the validity of earlier acts by individuals or of administrative or
judicial authorities based on this norm. This delicate problem does not
permit a general answer. Even in the United States, with its long experi88 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
89 But see Sharma, supra note 82, at 44, for the binding effect which the Indian Constitution accords the Supreme Court's decision on the lower courts.
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ence in this matter, there is no clear-cut solution; the doctrine of res judicata may play a certain role; otherwise practical considerations may
determine the possible retroactive consequences. The only conjecture one
might venture here is that most, if not all states in this category have
found methods to release prisoners held under a statute that has later
been judged unconstitutional, be this by a habeas corpus application, as
in the United States, or by other proceedings.
(5) The system of incidental judicial review in the course of the
ordinary proceedings has important advantages. The courts are drawn
into the political struggle only where this is inevitable for fulfilling their
primary function. They do not have to decide more than the pending
case requires. The fact that an unconstitutional statute is not annulled
with general effect helps to prevent a head-on clash with the legislature.
It also ensures a certain flexibility. This flexibility can, however, prove a
liability. Up to the judgment of the highest court the fate of a possibly
unconstitutional statute remains uncertain. The situation is particularly
awkward when several contradictory rulings on the constitutionality of
the statute exist. Even the final decision might not clarify all issues so
long as the law remains on the statute books. Another drawback is the
somewhat haphazard character of this type of review: It can take place
only if someone is in a position (legal standing) and willing to attack a
perhaps unconstitutional statute. Thus it appears that the advantages and
disadvantages are two sides of the same coin; the system's strength lies
in its weaknesses and vice versa. In any event this kind of review is
limited by one indispensable prerequisite: All courts must be organized
like a judicial pyramid or at least be headed by a single supreme court.
This type of incidental control would be unworkable in states with specialized branches of courts, each branch having an apex of its own.
V
INCIDENTAL

REvIEw LEADING To SUBMISSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE TO A SPECIALIZED CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

(1) Incidental judicial control is founded on the duty and right of
all courts to examine the constitutionality of a statute as far as this is
relevant for the derision in a pending case. Under some constitutions this
reviewing power is limited; the courts must-if they, or merely one of the
parties, consider the statute unconstitutional-refer this issue to a higher
judicial authority for a binding decision. Meanwhile the original case
rests. The difference between these and the certifying proceedings in the
United States already mentioned" is twofold: here the submitting court
90 Cf. Part IV(2) of the text supra.

1966]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES

(1) must refer the question and (2) must confine its query to the constitutionality of the statute. The states which have made their specialized
constitutional courts the sole arbiter in this constitutional issue are
Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Yugoslavia' Only in
Austria does this arrangement antedate World War II. This monopoly,
usually prescribed expressis verbis in the constitution, is partly motivated
by respect for the legislature: not every court should be allowed to disregard the will of parliament. Furthermore under these constitutions, that
of Cyprus excepted, a finding that a statute is unconstitutional will usually void or annul it. This effect necessitates a decision by a single
authority.
The (subsequent) proceedings now to be sketched are not the only
forms of judicial review in the states of this group. Previous judicial
control exists, as we have noted, by binding decisions on a limited scale
in Austria, Germany, and Italy; and to a larger extent in Cyprus." All
states of this category have-an additional type of subsequent review,
namely the (abstract) control of norms upon the application of certain
public authorities. 93 In some of these countries the same statute could
be examined interchangeably in previous review or one of the two kinds
of subsequent review.
(2) (a) In Austria only the "Oberste Gerichtshof" (the highest court
in criminal cases and in private-law cases) and the "Verwaltungsgerichtshof" (the highest administrative law court) must refer the controversial
statute to the Constitutional Court. All other Austrian courts are to review
only lower-ranking laws, but apply a regularly published statute even if
they consider it unconstitutional. Yugoslavia seems to follow principles
similar to those in Austria. Under Article 249, Paragraph 1, Numbers
3 and 5 of the Yugoslavian Constitution, however, the highest courts and
the constitutional courts of the member states, in addition to the highest
federal courts, may submit statutes for review. 4 In the four other states
noted here each court examines the constitutionality of a statute independently, under certain conditions submitting it to the constitutional
court.
91 With the exception of Yugoslavia, all these states are examined in Constitutional
Review. Submission of this constitutional question to a nonspecialized supreme court
is not included in this section. Cf. notes 29, 80 supra. Art. 100 of the German Constitution
also has to be omitted insofar as it orders all courts to submit state statutes they consider
incompatible with a state constitution to the appropriate state constitutional court.
92 Cf. Part I1(3) (b) of the text supra.
93 Cf. Part VI of the text infra.
94 Under Art. 149, Para. 3 of the Constitution, each court which has to enforce a statute
it deems unconstitutional shall propose to the competent highest court in its branch that
the dubious statute be submitted for review to the Constitutional Court.
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(b) In most states all formal statutes are to be submitted; in Germany
and Cyprus statutes approving an international treaty are included; in
Turkey, the standing rules of Parliament as well. Nevertheless there are
a few exceptions: the Turkish Constitution omits some statutes expressis
verbis; in Germany the Constitutional Court has interpreted Article 100,
Paragraph 1 of the Constitution so as to exclude, besides all lower-ranking
law, preconstitutional statutes. Even though not all applicable constitutional or statutory provisions explicitly prescribe it, the question of constitutionality is to be submitted to the constitutional court only if relevant
for the decision in the original case. Problems may arise if the submitting
court believes that its decision in the original case depends on the constitutionality of a statute, whereas the constitutional court is of the opposite
opinion. Probably the most practical solution for this impasse, in which
neither court can decide, has been found in Germany and Italy: the
opinion of the submitting court as to the relevancy of the statute's constitutionality is binding on the constitutional court, if not obviously unreasonable. The qualification has had a restraining influence on the lower
courts.
In some respects the prerequisites for the submission differ: In Germany the lower court is to submit the statute only on conviction of its
unconstitutionality; if merely dubious, it must apply it. In most other
countries mere doubts of the submitting court regarding the constitutionality suffice for referral to the constitutional court. In Cyprus the question
of constitutionality must be passed on to the Constitutional Court even
if only raised by a litigant against the opinion of the Court that the
statute is not faulty. On the other hand, under the Cyprus Constitution, it
is uncertain whether a court, even if it is sure that a statute is unconstitutional, may submit the question to the Constitutional Court of its own
accord. The Constitutional Court has in part solved these difficulties
through interpretation of Article 144 of the Constitution.
(c) The examination by the constitutional courts is limited to the parts
of the statute referred to by the submitting court. The procedures before
the constitutional courts are, in the terms already explained, not adversary, but objective. They do not primarily serve the rights of the parties
in the original case, but are to safeguard the legal order regardless of
individual interests. In Italy this principle has been extended to require a
decision of the Constitutional Court, even if this decision has become
superfluous for the original case through withdrawal by the claimant or
on other grounds. At this point the "case and controversy theory" as the
basis of incidental review is discarded. The continuation of these proceedings before the Constitutional Court, independent of any concrete case,
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has made some Italian scholars question their judicial nature 5 Although
no proceedings of this category are contentious, the parties in the original
suit are entitled to submit briefs and/or to be heard. Due to their particular responsibility for upholding the legal order, certain highest organs of
the state have the same right. In Germany, the legislature, as well as the
federal cabinet, may participate; in Austria and Italy, the interests of the
legislature whose statute is under attack will be represented by the cabinet, or, where applicable, by the Prime Minister 6
(3) (a) As a rule the constitutional courts decide only on the portions of the statute submitted for examination. In Germany, however,
the Federal Constitutional Court may void other parts of this statute if
they are unconstitutional for the same reasons as those submitted.9 7 The
Constitutional Court of Germany is not allowed, however, to extend an
affirmative decision to additional sections of the statute. Under Article 23
of the Statute on the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, this court may
examine an entire statute even though the applicant submitted only part
of it for review.
In some states, the constitutional courts face a time limit for their
ruling. In Austria, it is,wherever possible, a month; in Turkey, three
months. If the Turkish Constitutional Court fails to meet this deadline,
the decision on the constitutionality reverts to the submitting court. In
contrast, for instance, to the United States Supreme Court rendering a
final decision, the constitutional courts in this group do not settle the
original case. This task falls to the submitting court on the basis of the
constitutional court's judgment.
(b) The constitutional court's finding regarding the statute is usually
more important in its general effect than in its bearing on the original
case. Considering the reasons for the monopoly of constitutional courts in
these questions, one would expect that a negative opinion on the constitutionality of the statute would inevitably annul it. This, however, is not
always the case.
In Germany an affirmative decision states that the statute is, as far
as the examination has gone, compatible with the Constitution. There is
no pronouncement on its validity in general, and later judicial review for
other reasons is not excluded. A negative judgment declares the statute
or parts of it unconstitutional and void. Both declarations have the force
of a statute and are published accordingly.
95 Cf. Sandulli, Constitutional Review 304; Telchini, "La Cour Constitutionelle en
Italie," 15 Revue Internationale de Droit Compar6 52 (1963) (Paris). For Yugoslavia, cf.
Art. 35 of the Statute on the Constitutional Court.
96 The Attorney General plays a somewhat similar role in the United States. Cf. Part
IV(2) of the text supra.
97 Section 78 B. Verf. G.G.
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If the Austrian Constitutional Court considers the questioned statute
constitutional, it simply remands it to the submitting court; otherwise it
will void it with the same outcome as in Germany.
Likewise in Italy an affirmative decision has no general effect, whereas
a negative one annuls the statute.98
The Yugoslavian Constitutional Court, upon finding a statute constitutional, may stipulate by binding declaration the interpretation which
rendered the statute compatible with the Constitution.99 If the Court holds
a statute unconstitutional this decision also has general effect, but, as will
be seen later, does not immediately void the statute.
In Turkey, where the rule for an unconstitutional statute is annulment,
the Constitutional Court is empowered by Article 152, Paragraph 4 of the
Constitution to confine the decision to the original case and its parties.
This constitutional provision is rather questionable, since it can expose
the Court to undue political pressure.
In Cyprus this problem has been dealt with in a rather curious manner.
Under Article 148 of the Constitution any decision of the Constitutional
Court is binding on all courts, organs, authorities and persons in the Republic; but Article 144, Paragraph 3 makes an exception for the very
cases we are here concerned with: if the Constitutional Court finds the
statute submitted unconstitutional, the ruling will be binding merely on
the submitting court and the parties of the original case, making the
statute inapplicable only in the original proceedings. This exception was
probably prompted by the hope of avoiding the difficulties arising from
ab initio voidances of statutes. As a result, however, the Court may be
bothered repeatedly with the same question. The Constitutional Court has
tried to avoid this dilemma where possible by means of interpretation.
(c) There is no general answer to the question whether a judgment
finding a statute unconstitutional has retroactive effect, i.e., is void ab
initio. The practice prevailing in the states with incidental judicial review
by all courts appears to be a logical solution: if a statute is pronounced
unconstitutional there, it was unconstitutional from its inception, and
should therefore always have been disregarded. Yet the statute has usually been the legal basis for numerous transactions and events; frequently
they cannot be reversed without great hardship to individuals and dangers
to the legal and social fabric of the community. Therefore exceptions to
the general principle of retroactivity are necessary.10 ° The stability of the
98 See Telchini, supra note 95, at 50.

99 Art. 250 of the Constitution. The corresponding Art. 28 of the Statute on the
Constitutional Court appears through a somewhat different wording to add a new requirement for the application of art. 250.
100 Cf. Part IV(4) of the text supra.
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legal order and the faith of the people and public authorities therein are
jeopardized to a greater extent when a judgment finding a statute unconstitutional does not merely disregard it in the particular case, but voids it
with general effect. In Germany, the only state where an unconstitutional
statute is annulled ex tunc, Section 79 B. Verf. G.G. tries to solve the
problems stemming from retroactivity roughly as follows: any administrative or judicial act which can no longer be challenged by legal means
will remain in force despite having been based on an unconstitutional
statute. If, however, such a final decision has not yet been carried out, the
voidance of the statute prevents its execution. These principles leave some
questions open, 0 1 but by and large their result is the protection of the
beati possidentes, who had already acquired something on the strength of
the statute. An example can demonstrate the ensuing inequality: not only
the claimant, who in the original case had attacked a statute as an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power, but all other persons who have for
any reason whatsoever not yet paid their taxes will benefit from the voidance. Yet those who have faithfully made their payments have no right to
a refund. This hardship in individual cases can be justified only by recourse to legal stability and the people's trust in it as values overriding
individual justice under certain circumstances. In Germany the status quo
ante will not be preserved in one important exception: a final criminal
sentence based on a voided statute is always open to review. Here again
we have a parallel to the United States and some other countries with
mere incidental judicial review.
The retroactive effect may perhaps in certain cases even influence a
constitutional court's decision. The consequences of voiding a statute ex
tunc are sometimes difficult to assess. How, for instance, will the annulment of a tax statute affect the budget? How long will it take the legislature to fill the gap? In a multitude of cases in Germany, income tax
assessment by the revenue authorities was postponed for about two years
until Parliament was able to adjust the law to a judgment striking down
an income tax provision. Eventualities such as these add to the already
tremendous responsibility of the court and may occasionally be detrimental even to judicious decisions.
In Austria, Cyprus, Italy, and Turkey, a statute is voided ex nunc, i.e.,
on the publication of the decision in the official legal gazette. This solves
some, but not all of the difficulties just mentioned. The problem of inequality appears here, too, but in a different setting. In Austria, for ex101 For the effects of a statute's annulment on private-law transactions, see Dilcher,
"Rechtsgeschbifte

auf verfassungswidriger

Praxis 193 (1964).
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ample, the unconstitutional statute will still be applied to all cases originating prior to the court's ruling. Only in the one case submitted to the
Constitutional Court will the statute be treated as unconstitutional ex
tunc, i.e., will the decision have retroactive effect. Without this exception
it would be futile for any submitting court to apply to the Constitutional
Court. It does not seem just that the mere time factor, the somewhat
accidental moment of the judgment, should thus determine rights and
duties. It also seems unjust that a statute is still applied after having
been declared unconstitutional by the competent authority. Here again
the only justification is the stability of the legal order and the faith
people place in it.102
Another problem arising from the annulment of a statute is the effect
of the judgment on the norms which the voided statute had superseded.
Are they automatically revived? There is no rule common to all the
states of this group. Article 140, Paragraph 4 of the Austrian Constitution gives a clear-cut solution: the annulment of a statute revives ipso iure
all statutory provisions which the voided norm had abrogated, if the Constitutional Court fails to rule otherwise. The publication of the statute's
voidance must simultaneously list the statutory provisions which have
regained validity. It is remarkable that the Constitution allows the Constitutional Court complete latitude in preventing the revival of abrogated
statutes.
In Austria the Constitutional Court may suspend the annulling effect
of its decision for a year; in Turkey, for six months. In the interim Parliament may conform the law to the ruling, thereby avoiding a legal
vacuum. Constitutional provisions like these can insure a flexibility in
timing of voidance, which may in certain cases be desirable. But perhaps
these advantages are outweighed by the following factors: both the
Austrian and the Turkish Constitutions leave the timing entirely to the
discretion of the constitutional courts. Consequently their task is not
the interpretation of a constitutional norm, but really a political decision.
This evaluation would not be changed noticeably by an attempt to prescribe constitutional standards for the courts, since these criteria would
have to be couched in the most general terms in order to serve their pur-'
pose, namely allowing latitude to the courts in timing the effects of
their decision according to expediency. The courts might not be prepared
for such a political responsibility; they might be exposed to undue pressure, and, if their clockwork proved inopportune politically, to severe
criticism undermining their judicial prestige as well. 10 3
102
103

Cf. the discussion in Constitutional Review 785.
Azrak, "Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Tiirkei," 11 J.6.R. 89 (1962), criticizes on the
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By comparison the corresponding provisions in the Yugoslav Constitution may be preferable, if really observed. If the Federal Constitutional
Court finds a statute unconstitutional, the federal or respectively the
member state legislature is to adjust its product to the Constitution
within six months from the publication of the decision. Failing this, the
statute or its unconstitutional provisions shall cease to be valid, and the
Court shall declare them invalid by its decision. Pending this final voidance, the Court shall declare the unconstitutional provisions inoperative. 4 In any event the Court cannot be pressed in regard to the time
factor, and the political responsibility rests squarely with whichever
legislature is competent in each case. Under Article 29 of the Statute on
the Constitutional Court, the voidance of the unconstitutional statute
takes effect on the day of publication in the Federal Gazette. According
to Article 30 of the Statute on the Constitutional Court, subordinate legislation based on the voided statute becomes inoperative if the judgment
of the Constitutional Court indicates that this legislation, too, is unconstitutional; the Court can, however, void it expressis verbis. As a matter
of principle, those individual administrative or court decisions which are
no longer open to appeal remain in force even though they are based on a
statute which later is voided. Articles 31 and following of the Statute on
the Constitutional Court enumerate several modifications of this general
rule, however. They are too intricate to be surveyed here. It need only be
mentioned that every person who has met with a legal punishment is
entitled to its review when the statute on which the sanction is based
has been voided.
(4) Incidental judicial review leading to submission of the constitutional issue to a specialized constitutional court, could, as above, be
described on an institutional and procedural basis. A thorough evaluation,
however, would only be possible within the entire legal and political framework of each particular state, an undertaking not feasible here. Yet a
few general observations may be useful.
Very important is the fact that this reviewing system exists only in
states with a great or at least considerable degree of specialization within
the court structure. The creation of specialized constitutional courts here
was largely motivated by the fear of disparate judicial interpretations of
the constitution through separate highest courts in the fields of, for example, criminal and civil law, general administrative and tax law. Judicial
review through all courts with the final responsibility for rulings on the
ground that the unconstitutional statutes may remain in force six months more. He also
fears abuses.
1o4 Cf. Arts. 245, 246 of the Constitution; Art. 25 of the Statute on the Constitutional
Court.
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constitutionality of statutes falling solely to a specialized constitutional
court insures a uniform interpretation of the constitutional issue. It also
makes possible the annulment of a statute through a negative finding.
As several highest courts in the various fields of law are unlikely to
enjoy the prestige of the one supreme court in an unspecialized court
system, it seems wise to entrust final decisions on the constitutionality of
statutes, not to one of them, but to a constitutional court composed of
eminent jurists. They should be elected through special procedures appropriate to guarantee this court a rank above all others. 1 5
This system may considerably influence the attitude of the court and
its exercise of judicial review. The guiding principles of the United States
Supreme Court mentioned as examples for other states with mere incidental judicial control of statutes' 016 apply here only in part. As a rule
the constitutional court must answer the constitutional question of the
submitting court unless the question is obviously unreasonable; its special
assignment prevents it from disposing of the issue on other grounds, as
can, for instance, the supreme courts in most common-law countries. So
long as a constitutional provision appropriate as a yardstick exists, the
constitutional court may not resort to the "political question doctrine"
in order to avoid a decision, nor would it probably be inclined to do so.
The outlook of a special court which the constitution has appointed expressis verbis sole arbiter on the constitutionality of statutes will probably
differ from that of most nonspecialized supreme courts: The latters' rights
to exercise judicial control rest frequently on mere interpretation of the
constitution; they review the constitutionality of statutes only occasionally and as a side line. On the other hand, a special constitutional court
is more inclined to consider itself a "Verfassungsorgan," one of the highest
organs of the state,10 7 definitely on a par with the legislature and the
305 Cf. Part 11(2), (3) of the text supra.
106 Cf. Part IV(3) of the text supra.
107 For a discussion of the situations in Germany, Italy and Turkey, cf. the following
sources and opinions: The most recent article, "Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,"
by Prof. Leibholz, judge of the Federal Constitutional Court, appeared in an official
publication of this court, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 61 (1963). 6 J.5.R. 110-221 (1957)
contains the relevant material, especially the memorandum of the Federal Constitutional
Court on its status. For Italy, see, e.g., Azzariti (the first president of the Italian Constitutional Court), 'Die Stellung des Verfassungsgerichtshofs in der italienischen Staatsordnung,"
8 J..R. 13 (1959); 7 J.A5.R.

191 (1958); Leisner, "Die klassischen Freiheitsrechte in der

italienischen Verfassungsrechtsprechung," 10 J..R. 243, 246, 252 (1961); Sandulli, Constitutional Review 298; Telchini, supra note 95, at 51. For Turkey, cf. Azrak, supra note
103, at 76; Balta, Constitutional Review 559. These articles and materials clearly reveal that
the qualification as "Verfassungsorgan" is not a question of semantics but one of considerable
practical importance. From this point of view it is noteworthy that the very first article of
the Statute on the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia describes this court as an independent
federal organ based on the Constitution (in the German translation: "selbstaendiges Bundesorgan auf Grund der Bundesverfassung").
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executive, than are the supreme courts in, say, some Commonwealth or
Latin American countries, in Norway or Japan; although probably not
more than is the United States Supreme Court with its great prestige and
well-established tradition.
On a more technical scale, if even the lowest court may submit the
question of a statute's constitutionality directly to the constitutional
court, considerable time can be saved in obtaining a final decision. On
the other hand, a filtering process through the usual channels may prevent an overcrowding of the constitutional court's docket which might
later waste the time otherwise saved. The processing through the regular
channels would also give the constitutional court a broader perspective
and the benefit of more extensive judicial experience before the final
judgment. If one might still favor direct submission to the constitutional
court by any court, as is the rule in all states of this group except Austria
and Yugoslavia, it would be for the following reasons. The protection of
individuals against unconstitutional statutes might be weakened too much
if the constitutional court's being called to action depends exclusively on
the opinion of one single court. Furthermore in a legal order which permits
judicial review at all, no judge of even the lowest court should be forced
to apply a statute he holds unconstitutional, comforted merely by the
hope that the highest court will later refer the statute to the constitutional
court.
If such a sweeping statement is permissible, the observer might consider incidental judicial review of statutes leading through the ordinary
channels to a single supreme court best suited to states with a well-established, non-specialized court system. However, if the supreme court is
not bound to review every case, only a right of appeal in all controversies
where the constitutionality of a statute is involved would make judicial
review really effective. Again the United States may serve as an illustration. In countries with specialized court structures and with more than
one supreme court one might, as already noted, prefer direct submission
of the constitutional question to the constitutional court by any tribunal.
Where individuals have, in addition to the procedures dealt with here, a
special remedy for attacking a statute at the constitutional court, as for
instance in Germany,10 8 it might suffice for the courts to submit statutes
only when convinced of their unconstitutionality. Where this is not the
case, it seems best to prescribe submission upon mere doubts of the constitutionality. This is actually the case in the other states of this category,
with the possible exception of Yugoslavia.
108 Cf. Part VII of the text infra.
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VI
SUBSEQUENT REVIEW BY CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS UPON APPLICATION OF CERTAIN
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

(1) The types of previous review entitling certain highest organs of
the state to obtain the binding decision of a special constitutional court
on the constitutionality of an unpublished statute'019 have parallels in
subsequent control. A sketch of six different countries will afford a balanced picture. The states of this group," 0 Austria, Cyprus, Germany,
Italy, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, also have, as already noted,"' incidental
judicial review leading to submission of the constitutional question to a
special constitutional court.
The proceedings we are here concerned with are prescribed expressis
verbis in the respective constitutions of all the countries except Italy,
where they are based on a special statute of constitutional rank. Despite
their common feature-namely, direct introduction to a constitutional
court by a restricted group of public authorities-they serve somewhat
varying purposes. This becomes apparent only in a combination of several
factors, namely the statutes open to this kind of review, the extent to
which they are reviewable, and the public bodies entitled to initiate these
proceedings. As these elements are inextricably intermeshed, they are to
be viewed together within the setting of each state.
In Germany the federal or a state cabinet can request the Constitutional Court to examine any statute, and the same right is given to a
one-third minority of the "Bundestag." This application may serve one
of two purposes: The applicant may want to have a statute voided as
unconstitutional; or he may want it declared constitutional following the
refusal by a court, by an administrative or other governmental agency or
organ to apply it on grounds of unconstitutionality." 2 Applications with
the second aim, that of upholding a dubious statute, are a feature unique
to Germany.
The motives for introducing these proceedings were the following: (1)
all statutes should always conform to the Constitution; (2) all doubts
in this regard should be resolved by the Federal Constitutional Court;
(3) incidental judicial control alone, since it presupposes a case or controversy, would not guarantee the examination of each questionable statute;
(4) the federal and state cabinets would feel a special responsibility for
109 Cf. Part 111(3) of the text supra.
110 All these states except Yugoslavia are examined in Constitutional Review.
"'
Cf. Part IV(l) of the text supra.
112 Cf. Art. 93, Para. 1, No. 2 of the Constitution; § 76 B. Verf. G.G.
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the constitutional order and utilize these additional proceedings if necessary. The parliamentary minority was included among the possible applicants just in case the executive organs would not live up to their responsibility.
In Austria the federal cabinet may attack all statutes of the "LAnder,"
whose cabinets may in turn challenge all federal statutes. As under the
German Constitution (but in contrast to previous review in Austria),"'
this right is not restricted to safeguarding the respective spheres of competence. The federal cabinet may, for instance, assert that a state statute
violates individual constitutional rights and the state cabinet may do the
same with federal statutes.
In Italy the purpose of these proceedings is more narrow. In parallel
to previous control of regional and provincial statutes initiated by the
Italian cabinet, 1 4 the regions may attack statutes passed by the Italian
legislature, but only for invading their own fields of jurisdiction. Furthermore, any region may have a statute of another region examined for the
same reasons." 5 In contrast to Austria and Germany, there is a time
limit for the application, and it is rather short.
Turkey has two types of these proceedings, but from both, certain
statutes are excepted by the Constitution. The President of the Republic,
political parties of a certain size and their parliamentary factions, as well
as a one-sixth minority of Parliament may question the constitutionality
of a statute or of the Standing Rules of Parliament. As in Austria and
Germany, a possible infringement of the applicant's constitutional rights
or competences is not required, probably for reasons similar to those in
Germany. Another group of applicants, however, may attack a statute
only for an alleged interference with their own existence and functions.
They are (a) the High judicial Council, a committee of judges concerned
with, among other things, choosing members of the judiciary,", 6 (b) the
three highest courts in the field of criminal and private, administrative,
and military criminal law, and (c) the universities." 7 The fathers of
the Constitution considered these institutions so important that they accorded them the constitutional right of defending their existence and independence directly before the Constitutional Court. The ninety-day time
limit for applying to the Constitutional Court is somewhat longer than
that in Italy.
113 See
114 Cf.
115 Cf.
di Diritto
116 See
117 Cf.

Part M(3) (c), (5) of
Part 111(3) (b), (5) of
Crisafulli, "Le Regioni
pubblico 537 (1963).
Azrak, supra note 103,
note 126 infra.

the text supra.
the text supra.
davanti alla Corte costituzionale," 13 Rivista Trimestrale
at 81, 87.
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In Yugoslavia the picture resembles Turkey in one important respect:
in the first category of cases (a), the applicants do not have to show a
possible violation of their own constitutional rights; in the second group
(b), they do have to show a possible violation. (a) Under Article 249 of
the Constitution, the Federal Assembly, the assemblies of the member
states, and the executive councils of the federation and of the states
may all apply to the Constitutional Court. However, the Federal
Executive Council may only question the constitutionality of state
statutes and the executive councils of the member states may only
question the constitutionality of federal statutes. The Federal Public
Prosecutor may challenge any statute, provided the question of its constitutionality originated within his jurisdiction. (b) In contrast, the assemblies of certain self-governing communities and organizations may do the
same only on the assertion that the statute interferes with their constitutional rights. Article 249 authorizes the legislature to broaden the category of applicants even further. The details of the corresponding articles
of the Statute on the Constitutional Court, Articles 19 and following,
cannot lie described here. It is sufficient to note that the right to institute
proceedings of this kind is more inclusive in Yugoslavia than in any other
country. However, the practical significance of these provisions cannot
be assessed yet.
In Cyprus one finds two types of these proceedings, only one of which
merits mention here. The (Greek) President and the (Turkish) VicePresident may either alone or together bring any statute before the Constitutional Court, but only if they allege discrimination against either part
of the population. The time limit is seventy-five days from publication.
The mere application suspends the effect of the statute until the final
judgment.
(2) Although in some states these proceedings presuppose an asserted
violation of the applicant's constitutional rights or competences, they are
as a rule objective, and not, as in Italy, adversary. Nowhere must the
legislature appear as a defendant, although it is usually entitled to present
its views." 8
The effect of the decision is generally the same as in incidental review
leading to submission of the constitutional question to a constitutional
court." 9 Therefore only one major deviation should be noted. In Turkey
the judgment finding a statute unconstitutional in incidental review upon
the submission of a court may limit its effect to that particular case. This
118 Cf. Engelhardt, "Das richterliche Priifungsrecht im modernen Verfassungsstaat,"
8 J.B.R. 101, 122 (1959); Ulshiafer, Constitutional Review 754. For Yugoslavia, cf. Arts. 53,
65 of the Statute on the Constitutional Court.
119 Cf. Part V(3) (b) of the text supra.
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cannot be done in the proceedings with which we are now concerned: if
the Constitutional Court considers a statute or a part of it unconstitutional, it must annul it with general effect.
(3) These proceedings cannot be evaluated in a vacuum any more than
the other methods of judicial control. But a few observations seem appropriate. It is not by mere accident that this review in abstracto is not a
substitute for, but only a supplement to, incidental judicial control. In a
free and democratic society adhering to judicial review in principle,
individuals adversely affected by a perhaps unconstitutional statute
should have a right themselves to initiate its examination. On the other
hand, individuals are not always able to institute judicial review; they
may, for instance, lack a genuine legal interest. Furthermore, persons
legally entitled to go to court may not wish to spend the energy, time and
money needed.'
Those drafters of constitutions, dissatisfied with the
somewhat haphazard system of mere incidental control, devised proceedings on the application of a limited number of public authorities so as to
make examination of all statutes possible. It would be unrealistic, however, to expect, even under those constitutions where an alleged violation
of the applicant's own rights and competences is not required, that each
doubtful statute would actually be reviewed.
The experiences with the "abstrakte Normenkontrolle," as these objective proceedings are called in Germany, may demonstrate this. During
its first ten years the Federal Constitutional Court decided twenty such
cases. In five cases the applicant wanted a statute questioned by some
other authority declared constitutional. In nine cases a state cabinet
challenged a federal statute; in two cases the federal cabinet attacked a
state statute; and in two cases a parliamentary minority asked for annulment of a federal statute. The remaining cases are irrelevant here. From
the proceedings which aimed at voiding a statute one may gather that, as
a rule, the applicants will bring a statute before the Constitutional Court
only if somehow adversely affected by it. Thus, for example, a state
cabinet may consider a federal statute an intrusion on the state's competence, while the federal cabinet may believe the same of a state statute;
or a federal statute may conflict with the political opinions of a state
cabinet, or of a minority of the federal parliament. Unless the possible
applicants have in some way been touched in their own interests-be
they legal, political or other-they are unlikely to institute proceedings
out of mere zeal for the constitutionality of statutes in abstracto. If these
legal actions have still had a considerable impact-four state and four
federal statutory provisions having been voided within ten years-it is for
120

Cf. Part IV(5) of the text supra.
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the following reasons. Among the possible applicants the main political
trends are usually represented. Furthermore, if a dubious statute is of
some consequence, one of the possible applicants is likely to consider the
way to the Constitutional Court politically expedient. This is all one
might reasonably expect. It would probably overtax the federal or a state
cabinet or the one-third parliamentary minority to act contrary to their
own major political interests in these matters. If the framers of a constitution desire each dubious statute to be submitted to judicial review
without exception, they would either have to require some public authority
to refer the statute, or authorize the Court to examine all statutes ex
officio. The first solution is used in France in the form of previous review,
but only in respect to "lois organiques," which comprise a very small
percentage of all statutes.12 1 The second solution is provided for in Yugoslavia. Under Article 249, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court may examine the constitutionality of statutes on its own
initiative. Article 61 of the Statute on the Constitutional Court contains
some procedural details. The practical import remains to be seen.
The considerations which have been described in respect to Germany's
"abstrakte Normenkontrolle" will probably apply in the other states
which permit proceedings without alleged violations of the applicant's
rights or powers. As for the states where an assertion of such intrusions
is required, these proceedings are applicable to a still more limited degree.
There it is even more desirable that the legal actions instituted by public
authorities directly before the constitutional court merely serve as a
supplement to, but not as a substitute for, the right of individuals to start
judicial review.
(4) Belonging only partially in this group, and forming simultaneously
a link with the proceedings to be dealt with next is the "Popularklage" in
Colombia. Any citizen may challenge the constitutionality of any regular
statute presently in effect, even if he is in no way injured or affected by it.
The function of upholding the Constitution, apart from any personal
interest, is here entrusted to the individual citizen; he has at least the
right to play the same role as some of the public authorities and bodies
just noted. Judicial practice has opened this direct application to the
Supreme Court for foreign residents and certain legal persons as well.
The procedures are objective. The decision will find the statute constitutional or unconstitutional with general effect. In the latter case, the statute
is not void ab initio, but only ex nunc. The far-reaching consequences of
these decisions contrast with the result of cases on appeal in incidental
121 Cf. Part M1I(3) (b) of the text supra.
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review; there the judgment has effect only inter partes. The direct
approach to the Supreme Court must be useful, since it has been a part
of the Constitution for over fifty years. The foreign observer, unfamiliar
with the Colombian legal system in general and with the temperament of
the population, may, however, marvel at the careful observance of the
Constitution by the law-making authorities and/or at the self-restraint
of the people, if these are the factors that prevent the Supreme Court
from being swamped with such applications.
Perhaps Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Statute on the Yugoslavian Constitutional Court also falls in this category: anyone may demand that the
Constitutional Court initiate proceedings to review the constitutionality
of a statute. If, as noted earlier, the application for the review of a statute
is made by some public authority mentioned in the Constitution or in the
Statute on the Constitutional Court, the Court must examine the constitutionality of the questioned statute. If, however, the application stems
from an individual, the Constitutional Court first examines whether the
application is justified and decides accordingly whether it will actually
review the statute: article 4, paragraph 2. The statute does not indicate
which conditions justify an individual application for review. It seems
possible that the individual applicant must assert a violation of his own
rights by the statute in question, although article 4, paragraph 1 does not
stipulate this. This would alter the character of these proceedings as a
"Popularkage," bringing them closer to the "Verfassungsbeschwerde"
dealt with in the following section of this survey. On the other hand, in
the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" the applicant has, under certain conditions,
a right to review which the applicant in Yugoslavia seems to lack. It
remains to be seen whether the Constitutional Court can clarify the
meaning of article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, and whether individual applications will be effective. The preliminary examination of each application
by a single member of the Court (Articles 56 and following of the Statute
on the Constitutional Court) will probably be of special importance in
these cases.
VII
SUBSEQUENT REvIEW IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS FOR THE PROTECTION

OF BASIC INDIvIUAL RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION

(1) It is not possible to survey those few remaining methods of judicial
review which, being atypical, do not fit into our main classifications. Thus
the German "Wahlpriifungsverfahren," an inquiry by the Constitutional
Court into complaints regarding the "Bundestag" elections, can only be
mentioned at this point. These proceedings may also lead to incidental
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review of the election statute; thus a decision of the Constitutional Court
has recently caused the legislature to alter the election statute in regard
to the apportionment of the election districts.'2 2
The last group of proceedings to be treated are those serving the
protection of fundamental individual rights granted by a constitution.
They are set apart from the types of review mentioned in the preceding
section through the applicants, and, again, through the aims of the applications. Although some exceptions have developed,'12 3 the applicants are, as
a rule, not public authorities or bodies, but private individuals; they
may attack a statute only if it interferes with their own rights granted
in or derived from the constitution.
The legal foundations for these proceedings vary in the three states
serving here as examples for this group, namely Germany, Mexico, and
Switzerland. In Germany the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" is based solely
on statutory authority.12 4 In Mexico, which may serve as an example for
some other Latin American countries, the principles of "juicio de amparo"
in Article 107 of the Constitution (abbreviated "Amparo") date back
more than a hundred years. In Switzerland Article 113, Paragraph 1,
Number 3 of the Constitution also has a long tradition.
There are certain differences regarding the competent courts. In Germany the Constitutional Court is to decide on the "Verfassungsbeschwerde;" the majority of cases falls to the first of the two "Senate." In
Switzerland the one Federal Court ("Bundesgericht") acts through the
"Staatsrechtliche Kammer."' 2 5 In contrast "Amparo" is, as far as relevant
here, entrusted to all federal courts.
(2) (a) In Germany and Mexico all statutes are open to attack through
the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" or respectively "Amparo." In Switzerland
judicial review is confined to the statutes of the "Kantone" (the member
states of the federation). This limitation is due to two factors. First, in
the "Referendumsdemokratie," i.e., a democratic system with direct
participation of the citizenry in the legislative process by means of the
referendum, judicial review of statutes would be tantamount to the courts'
controlling the people. The second obstacle is the dominant position of the
Federal Assembly, which, as the supreme authority of the federation, outranks all other powers.
Even if the application at first glance objects to an administrative or
122 16 B. Verf. G.E. 30 (1964); 18 Juristenzeitung 640 (1963); 16 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1600 (1963). For the problem in general, cf. Friesenhahn, Constitutional
Review 142.
123 Cf. Part VII (2) (b) of the text infra.
124 Section 90 B. Verf. G.G. (1951).
125 Cf. Part II(1) (b), (c)of the text supra.
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judicial act, the real target may be the allegedly unconstitutional statute
on which this decision is based. The proceedings under review here can
also open the way to a direct attack on the statute, provided it interferes
with the applicant's constitutional rights ipso facto without the intermediary of administrative or judicial action. An example would be a
statutory provision prohibiting certain economic activities. The difference
between direct and indirect attacks on the statute has a legal bearing on,
for instance, the need to exhaust previous legal remedies and on the effect
of the judgment.
It should be stressed that the proceedings which are here examined,
primarily in their use against statutes, may also serve in all three
countries for attacking administrative and judicial acts independent of
their statutory foundations. These aspects are no less important than
review of statutes. In Switzerland again this applies merely to acts of
the "Kanto ne."
(b) In comparison to the proceedings instituted by public authorities,
here the right of application is extended very widely. In Germany under
Section 90 B. Verf. G.G., anybody-meaning citizen or foreigner alikewho claims a violation of his fundamental rights and who meets certain
procedural requirements may apply to the Constitutional Court. German
legal persons are on the same footing if the allegedly violated basic right
covers legal persons, as, for instance, the right to own property or to
equal treatment by the legislature or by any other public authority.
Foreign legal persons are on a par, at least in some respects. As a rule
the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" extends as far as the material right it is
supposed to protect. The circle of possible applicants in Mexico and
Switzerland is also drawn widely, although there may be differences as
to foreign natural and legal persons.
Although this legal device was created in all three states for the protection of the individual against public authorities, it may to a small
extent also be used by public authorities themselves. Section 91 B. Verf.
G.G. enables German municipalities to defend their constitutional right
to self-government in this way. In all three states, municipalities and
other public corporations may use these proceedings for preserving, for
example, their property rights or resisting unequal treatment by a
statute. In Germany even the "Linder" could probably defend their
property rights against a federal expropriations statute.'2 6 In Mexico,
126 The "Verfassungsbeschwerde" is open to a state claiming a violation of basic procedural rights by a court which decided on the state's property rights. 6 B. Verf. G.E. 45
(1957). A recent decision of the Constitutional Court opened the "Verfassungsbeschwerde"
to universities and their faculties against alleged violations by the Ministry of Cultural

Affairs of their constitutional rights to free research and teaching, although the universities
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this is definitely the case. 7
(c) The aid of the competent court may be invoked only upon the
applicant's asserting a violation of his own constitutional rights. Mexico
alone makes exceptions in certain cases for relatives or even third persons.
The legal positions which may thus be defended vary from state to
state. In Germany Section 90 B. Verf. G.G. includes the basic rights in
Chapter I of the Constitution and certain other enumerated constitutional
rights, mainly of a procedural character. Through the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" the competence of the Constitutional Court is in practice
considerably wider than the wording of the rights mentioned might
suggest. The chief vehicles in this development have been Articles 3 and
2 of the Constitution. Article 3, granting legal equality, offers protection
against any arbitrary judicial, administrative or legislative act. As the
term arbitrary is rather vague, many applicants have asked the Court to
review their cases in entirety as do many courts of last resort, instead of
confining itself to the constitutional issue. Since the delimitation does not
permit an answer for all cases, it will always raise problems. 2 " Article 2
grants everyone the right to free development of his personality ("allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit") so long as he does not violate the rights of
others, the constitutional order or the moral code. The Constitutional
Court has opened the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" to every person claiming
that a legal provision restricting his general freedom under Article 2 is
not a proper part of the constitutional order. 129 The decision has con-

siderably widened the scope of this exceptional legal remedy. As one
result an applicant, while admitting on principle the constitutionality of
a statutory restriction of his freedom, may contest such a "Lnder"
statute on the ground that only the federal legislature is competent to
legislate in this particular area, or vice versa if he is contesting a federal
statute. 80
In Mexico "Amparo" was also created for the protection of individual
constitutional rights. As in Germany, federal and state authorities alike
may be taken to task for exceeding their constitutional limits at the
expense of individual rights. The courts have established the principle
that any governmental act not properly authorized by a statute interferes
as well as the faculties are themselves public authorities. See 15 B. Verf. G.E. 256 (1963);

78 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 437 (1963).
127

See Barberis, Constitutional Review 411.

Cf, Rinck, 'Die h6chstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum Gleichheitssatz in der
Bundesrepublik, der Schweiz, Osterreich, Italien, den U.SA. und Indien," 10 J..R. 269
(1961).
129 6 B. Verf. G.E. 32 (1957).
180 Concerning art. 2, cf. Dung, in Maunz & DUing, Grundgesetz Kommentar (1960);
Peters, Das Recht auf freie Entfaltung der Pers~nlichkeit in der h6chstrichterlichen Recht-28

sprechung (1963).
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with the guarantees of personal rights and freedoms. Hence "Amparo"
serves to secure not only the constitutionality, but also the legality of all
governmental actions.
In Switzerland the rights covered by the "staatsrechtliche Beschwerde"
under Article 113, Paragraph 1, Number 3 of the Constitution include
fundamental individual freedoms, legal equality, certain political rightsas for instance active and passive participation in elections-and some
legal institutions connected with individual rights.
(d) In the three states these special proceedings are, if used for an
attack against a judicial or administrative act, usually open only after
exhaustion of the ordinary means of legal redress. Thus, as a rule,
administrative acts must first be taken to court, and the judgments must
be appealed. The same applies when these decisions are challenged for
being based on an unconstitutional statute. Certain exceptions cannot be
examined here. A petitioner may, however, attack a statute directly for
interfering with his constitutional rights, if the statute does this without
the intermediary of administrative or judicial decisions. Usually in such
cases no other legal remedy exists.
If a statute is challenged directly, the time limit for application begins
with its taking effect or, if retroactive, on its publication. This time limit
ranges from thirty days in Switzerland to one year in Germany. When a
statute is contested indirectly, the time limit usually dates from the applicant's receipt of the administrative or judicial decision which his application primarily attacks.
The circle of public authorities which may submit briefs or be heard
in these proceedings is drawn most widely in Germany. 1 '
(e) A limine decisions enable the courts in each country to dispose
summarily of applications which are clearly inadmissible or obviously
unfounded. In Switzerland a unanimous opinion of three judges may
reject the application in this manner. The Swiss regulation has probably
influenced its German counterpart, introduced in 1956 to lessen the load
of the "Senat."'3 2 In 1963 an additional measure became law: an application which has passed a preliminary examination by the committee of
three judges may still be denied acceptance by the "Senat" to which the
committee belongs. The application is admitted only if at least two judges
believe that the decision on the material question will either clarify a
constitutional issue or that its refusal will cause a grave and inevitable
injury to the applicant. Hence if only one of the three committee members
advocates examination of the application, by the whole "Senat," he must
131 See § 94 B. Verf. G.G.
182 Section 91(a) (now § 93(a)) B. Verf. G.G.
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persuade one "Senat" member not on the committee to support this.
Failing the a limine decisions the Constitutional Court would not have
been able to cope at all with its work load; thus the overwhelming
majority of the circa 8,100 "Verfassungsbeschwerden" introduced in the
first ten years was disposed of by the committees of three judges. As a
rule, these committees and the "Senat" refusing acceptance to an application now communicate the reasons for this decision in only one sentence.
The formula somewhat resembles the United States Supreme Court's
"certiorari denied."
In Mexico the summary procedures reveal certain differences, depending on which kind of federal court handles "Amparo."
The procedures are objective rather than adversary. Written arguments
are the rule. In Germany the "Bundestag" and "Bundesrat," the federal
cabinet, and, if a state statute is under attack, also the state cabinet and
state parliament, are entitled to submit their views. In Mexico and Switzerland the circle of participants seems more restricted.
(f) In Germany a judgment finding a statute unconstitutional annuls it
ex tunc with general effect.183 If the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" was primarily directed against a final administrative or judicial decision based
on an unconstitutional statute, the decision will also fall. This does not
mean that the Constitutional Court will settle the case in its entirety; it
will usually refer the files back to the court whose judgment was at fault.
This court must then act upon the new findings. As in all other proceedings before the Constitutional Court, but in contrast to the proceedings
before all other German courts, the applicant does not have to pay court
expenses. If, however, the three-judge committee finds an unsuccessful
application an abuse of the legal remedy, it may impose a fine ranging
from DM 20. to DM 1000. So far this power has been used rather
sparingly.
In Mexico the judgment does not void an unconstitutional statute. It
has immediate effect only inter partes, although it may have important
indirect consequences for others. This result corresponds to the results in
84
customary incidental review by non-specialized courts.
Switzerland distinguishes between two groups of cases. (a) If an
unconstitutional statute is attacked directly, it will be voided with general
effect. The consequences for legal acts based on the statute are not prescribed by federal law, but are left to the competent authorities of the
"Kantone." (b) Challenges directed primarily against an administrative
or judicial ruling based on an unconstitutional statute will not lead to
133 Cf. Part V(3)(b), (c) of the text supra.
134 Cf. Part IV(4) of the text supra.
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voidance of the statute; instead only that particular ruling will be
affected.
(3) Each of the three proceedings surveyed in this section comprises
attacks not only on statutes, but also on administrative and judicial acts.
Even a brief evaluation cannot confine itself to a single one of these
functions. Each institution, "Amparo," "Verfassungsbeschwerde," and
"staatsrechtliche Beschwerde," is a legal unity, and to be viewed as such,
within its constitutional and political setting.
(a) Of the three, "Amparo" is probably the most consequential within
its legal system. In practice it is the judicial instrument for protection of
the Constitution against unconstitutional acts of the three branches of
government, especially as the courts of the member states have never
effectively used their right to judicial review under Article 133 of the
Constitution. "Amparo" covers the delimitation of federal and state competences as far as relevant for the protection of fundamental individual
rights. Perhaps even more important is the role it plays in guaranteeing
not only the constitutionality, but also the legality, of administrative and
judicial actions. In "Amparo" proceedings the courts fulfill, among other
things, the same tasks as, for example, specialized administrative courts
in France, Germany, Italy and Turkey. Of "Amparo's" manifold
functions the review of statutes is only one, though a very important,
part.
(b) By comparison the "staatsrechtliche Beschwerde" in Switzerland
is more limited, since it offers no protection against the federal legislature
or executive. Judicial review of federal statutes would require an alteration of the constitutional provision prohibiting it. This change would
probably be impossible without even more fundamental changes regarding the referendum in the legislative process and the position of the
Federal Assembly. According to competent Swiss observers, the introduction of such full-scale judicial review remains unlikely for some time
to come.' 35 The exclusion of federal administrative acts from the scope
of judicial review rests mainly on tradition. The "staatsrechtliche
Beschwerde" was introduced at a time when the overwhelming majority
of governmental actions was entrusted to the "Kantone." As the executive
powers of the federation continue to grow, thereby threatening the fundamental individual rights more than do executive acts of the "Kantone,"
an extension of federal judicial competence in this direction may, in the
long run, be inevitable.
However, as far as the jurisdiction of the "Bundesgericht" goes, i.e., in
'15Cf. Imboden, Constitutional Review 524; Eichenberger, "Richterstaat und Schweizerische Demokratie," 104 Zeitschrift ffir Schweizerisches Recht 1, 26 (1963).
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regard to all governmental acts of the "Kantone," the activity of this
court-mainly through the "staatsrechtliche Beschwerde"-is a cornerstone of the constitutional and legal system. In the judgment of so noted
an expert as Z. Giacometti, this type of constitutional jurisdiction is a
strong bulwark of the law and the Constitution-one main reason for
the trust of the people in the legal order and stability of the Swiss
member states.3 6 This impact cannot of course be ascertained by mere
figures. One might, however, note that the "Bundesgericht" has had an
annual average of over seven hundred "Staatsrechtliche Beschwerden"
37

during the last fifty years.1

(c) The "Verfassungsbeschwerde" does not have the same significance
for the German constitutional and legal order as do "Amparo" in Mexico
and, in regard to legal acts of the "Kantone," the "Staatsrechtliche
Beschwerde" in Switzerland. This is because in Germany so many other
legal remedies are available. Article 19, Paragraph 4, of the Constitution
makes the courts accessible to everyone who feels injured in not only his
constitutional, but also other legal rights by any public authority, in which
cases the highly specialized judiciary 138 must then examine the constitutionality and legality of governmental actions. Therefore, as against
administrative measures interfering with basic rights, the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" is merely an additional safeguard. In respect to judicial
decisions there is usually a right of appeal. The "Verfassungsbeschwerde"
is, however, the only effective legal remedy in the rare cases where the
legislature has failed to fulfill a legislative duty ("Gesetzgeberisches
Unterlassen").' In all cases its special feature lies in entitling all individuals to have the only really supreme judicial authority decide, namely
the Federal Constitutional Court. As already noted, judicial review of
statutes is also entrusted to the judiciary at large. Any court must submit
to the Constitutional Court only those statutes it considers unconstitutional. 40 In addition, certain public authorities have the right to institute
proceedings for clarifying a statute's constitutionality without having
been affected by it.'4 ' This makes possible judicial review even of those
statutes which no one is willing to challenge or which, for lack of a proper
legal interest, no one is entitled to attack. Yet the system is not altogether
watertight so long as some statutes can escape review by the Constitu136 In Fleiner & Giacometti, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht 898 (1949).
13T

Imboden, Constitutional Review 522.

18 See Kern, Gerichtsverfassungsrecht (3d ed. 1959).

139 Cf. 8 B. Verf. G.E. 28 (1958); 8 B. Verf. G.E. 1 (1958); 6 B. Verf. G.E. 257 (1957).
140 Cf. Part V(2) of the text supra.
141 Art. 93, Para. 1, No. 2 of the Constitution: cf. Part VI of the text supra.
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tional Court. The "'Verfassungsbeschwerde" serves as a means to close
the gap in cases where an individual cannot convince a court of a statute's
unconstitutionality, and therefore fails to achieve submission to the Constitutional Court, and where none of the possible applicants under Article
93, Paragraph 1, Number 2 of the Constitution cares to start proceedings.
The price paid for these endeavors at perfection of judicial review by
the Constitutional Court is fairly high. Of the over 8,100 "Verfassungsbeschwerden" that flooded the Court during its first ten years, fewer than
one per cent were successful. Many applicants, overlooking the "Verfassungsbeschwerdes" special function of protecting only basic rights, tried
to use this extraordinary legal remedy as just another type of appeal.
In a large number of cases inveterate malcontents were simply venting
their feelings. Thus the Court had to spend a disproportionate amount
of time and energy on work really beneath the dignity of the highest
tribunal. This has of course caused delays in other cases and a backlog
of work. The discussion on constitutional review during the International
Heidelberg Conference revealed that most non-German observers saw
no need for an institution similar to the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" in
142
their own country.
The German legislature's firm decision against eliminating the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" at the last alteration of the statute on the Constitutional
Court (B. Verf. G.G.) in the summer of 1963 was influenced largely by
the following motives. This legal device has had a wholesome educating
effect on all public powers, be they federal, state or local, legislative, executive or judicial. It has fostered a deeper appreciation of the importance
of basic rights, not only in public authorities, but also in public opinion
and individuals. If a considerable segment of the people has come to
think of the Constitutional Court as a main bulwark of individual freedom, this is largely due to the "Verfassungsbeschwerde." None of the
other proceedings leading to the Court could have had the same effect.
The preservation of the fundamental freedoms certainly does not depend
on the Court alone. Yet the image of the Constitution and of the Court
as its guardian, which the institution of the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" has
helped to create, is important in a state where democratic order had to
be reconstructed after the Hitler dictatorship.
One should also not overlook the contribution of the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" to the solution of important constitutional issues. 143 The
Cf. Constitutional Review 803, 809, 813.
Much depends, of course, on the Court's deciding in a consistent manner. Noteworthy in this respect are a Swiss observer's reservations regarding the United States
Supreme Court's success in clarifying important constitutional issues. See Wolf, Verfas142
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fundamental interpretation of the right to choose a trade or profession
freely,'4 4 the decision on the free development of one's personality, 40 the
two outstanding judgments on freedom of opinion,'14 as well as some
rulings on the principle of equal participation in elections 147 owe their
existence to the "Verfassungsbeschwerde." Some of the problems solved
by these decisions would not have come to the Constitutional Court
through other proceedings. Because the judiciary is divided into five independent branches, each with its own highest court, these issues might
thus never have found a uniform solution. The same holds true for a
number of judgments which have forced courts of various rank to observe the constitutional right to a fair hearing under Article 103 in the
most painstaking manner. 148 Not only the very few successful applications, but also some of the unsuccessful ones have contributed to the
clarification and the development of constitutional law. These cases gave
the Constitutional Court an opportunity to set the pattern for governmental activities conforming to the Constitution.
Under these circumstances the trend is not towards abolishing the
"Verfassungsbeschwerde, 'l' 4O but towards improving it, if possible, by
further streamlining the procedures. The price for preserving the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" in the future may consist in granting the Court full
discretion to reject any application on any ground whatsoever and without
giving any reasons-an obvious parallel to the basis for the formula of
the United States Supreme Court "certiorari denied." Meanwhile the
load of the overburdened Court may perhaps be lightened by two other
factors. If the Court succeeds in reducing the number of unsettled constitutional problems, it might be called upon less frequently by individuals,
lower courts and other public authorities. Furthermore, one can at least
hope that a better understanding by the people of the limits of basic
rights and of the special functions of the "Verfassungsbeschwerde" will
diminish the misuses of this legal institution. 10
sungsgerichtsbarkeit und Verfassungstreue in den Vereinigten Staaten 236, passim (1961).
The German Federal Constitutional Court with its mere twelve years of practice has
yet to face the test of time.
144 7 B. Verf. G.E. 377 (1958).
145 See note 129 supra.
146 12 B. Verf. G.E. 113 (1961) ; 7 B. Verf. G.E. 198 (1958).
147 12 B. Verf. G.E. 10 (1960); 11 B. Verf. G.E. 351 (1960); 11 B. Verf. G.E. 266 (1960).
148 Cf., e.g., 7 B. Verf. G.E. 275 (1958); 7 B. Verf. G.E. 53 (1957).
'49 Cf. Friesenhabn, Constitutional Review 167; Smend, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht
30 (1963) (address on the completion of the Constitutional Court's first decade). The
newspaper comments were also predominantly favorable at this and at other occasions.
For a critical observation, see the President of the Highest German Administrative Law
Court, Werner, Constitutional Review 806.
150 On a more technical scale, it might also become necessary to admit only applicants
represented by attorneys, as is the rule in the higher German courts.
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VIII
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The previous sketch could only touch on some problems connected
with judicial review and not even mention others. One feature common
to all or most states with judicial control of statutes should at least be
referred to here. Generally the courts not only interpret a statute to be
in conformity with the constitution whenever possible, 151 but also salvage
those parts which are separable from the unconstitutional portions. 52 In
this way they limit the negative effects of their findings on the legal
order. They also decrease the number and intensity of clashes with the
legislature and perhaps other political forces.
The problems of obiter dicta, of dissenting opinions,' 5 3 of stare decisis, 1 4 and, more important, of the norms serving as a yardstick for the
review of statutes,'5 5 certainly deserve a thorough examination on a comparative basis. These questions exceed the limits of review of statutes and
merge into the broader field of constitutional jurisdiction in general. They
lead, for instance, into one of the really fundamental issues, the relationship between the judges and the constitution. To mention only the extremes, are the courts when exercising judicial review, in practice really
the constitution, or are they mere interpreters and, at the same time, a
"puissance... pour ainsi dire invisible et nulle" (Montesquieu) ?1'1 These
151 Cf., e.g., text preceding note 86 supra.

152 Cf., e.g., Kauper, Constitutional Review 612-13; Heck, id. at 873-74. For Germany,
cf. Mueller, "tUnter welchen Voraussetzungen macht Nichtigkeit eines Gesetzesteiles das
ganze Gesetz nichtig?" 79 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 104 (1964). For a recent comparative
monograph on this method of constitutional interpretation in Austria, Germany, Italy and
Switzerland, see Haak, Normenkontrolle und verfassungskonforme Gesetzesauslegung des
Richters (1963).
153 Cf. Nadelmann, "Non-disclosure of Dissents in Constitutional Courts: Italy and
West Germany," 13 Am.J. Comp. L. 268 (1964).
154 Cf. Engelhardt, supra note 118, at 135.
155 Of particular interest in this regard are the "verfassungswidrige Verfassungsnormen"
and constitutional provisions disregarding basic principles of justice, especially of natural
law. Can a court have the authority to measure one constitutional provision against
another or, respectively, against principles of natural law? CL, e.g., Constitutional Review
151-52, 306, 376, 431, 735, 843; Engelhardt, supra note 118, at 126; Marcic, Verfassung
und Verfassungsgericht 126 (1963).
156 The problem has found particularly vivid expression in the title of Robert H.
Jackson's-later Mr. Justice Jackson-book, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941).
A somewhat contrasting title is that of Bickel, "The Least Dangerous Branch-The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics," 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964). The literature on the subject in
the United States seems boundiess; the more important works are so well known that
they need no mention here. For the Commonwealth, McWhinney, Judicial Review in the
English Speaking World (2d ed. 1960), should be mentioned. In Germany this topic has
aroused new interest, mainly because of the impact of the Federal Constitutional Court's
decisions. As introductions and guides to additional literature and sources the following
works may be mentioned: Fleischhauer, Die Grenzen der sachlichen Zustaendigkeit des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts bei der Kontrolle der gesetzgebenden Gewalt, der Staatsleitung
und der politischen Parteien (1960) (Diss. jur. Heidelberg) ; Marcic, supra note 155, at 202;
Roellecke, Politik und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Ueber immanente Grenzen der richterlichen Gewalt des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (1961). See also the literature on the status of

304

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

and some connected problems 1 57 cannot be dealt with in a relatively short
article attempting to cover judicial review of statutes in numerous states
with greatly differing court systems and procedures. The book Constitutional Review in the World Today-National Reports and Comparative
Studies has achieved outstanding results in these respects as well. 5 ' One
may hope that this exemplary undertaking will stimulate further comparative inquiries in the field of constitutional jurisdiction.
some specialized constitutional courts cited note 107 supra; Constitutional Review 828-74.
The Association of Austrian Jurists devoted a part of its first annual meeting to the
legal and political limits of constitutional jurisdiction. See Verhandlungen des ersten
oesterreichischen Juristentages (1961).
317 Closely related is the quest for the proper principles of constitutional interpretation.
The activities of the Federal Constitutional Court have caused a particularly strong
interest of German scholars in this subject. The Association of University Teachers of
Constitutional Law, which had devoted half of its meeting in 1950 to the limits of
constitutional review, see 9 Veroeffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 1-133 (1952), discussed in 1961 the principles of constitutional interpretation.
See 20 id. at 1-134 (1963). Of the numerous contributions to this subject in the German
language, the following may also be mentioned: Forsthoff, Zur Problematik der Verfassungsauslegung (1961); Krueger, "Verfassungswandung und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,"
Staatsverfassung und Kirchenrecht-Festgabe fuer R. Smend 151 (1962). For Italy, see
the recent article by Pierandrei, "Prinzipien der Verfassungsinterpretation in Italien," 12
J.6.R. 201 (1963).
159 Cf. note 4 supra.

